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With the proliferation of intranet networks comes an ever-increasing need 
to protect relevant information from misuse.  It is important to develop a security 
suite that seeks to achieve this protection in terms of securing the entire intranet 
together with the use of intrusion detection to detect anomalies and remedy any 
damage to the integrity of the intranet network.  A joint project involving the 
development of the security suite for an intranet has been researched and 
developed based on a hybrid security model.  We will discuss the particular 
design of the hybrid security model in detail and investigate its features in 
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With the proliferation of intranet networks comes an ever-increasing need to 
protect relevant information from misuse.  It is important to develop a security suite 
that seeks to achieve this protection in terms of securing the entire intranet together 
with the use of intrusion detection to detect anomalies and remedy any damage to the 
integrity of the intranet network.  A joint project involving the development of the 
security suite for an intranet has been researched and developed based on a hybrid 
security model.  The particular design of the hybrid security model will be discussed 
in detail together with the investigation of its features in maintaining high security in 
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Chapter 1: NUSNSG Security Suite – An Introduction 
 
As the discovery of network-related software vulnerabilities escalates, this leads 
to a greater workload in the IT departments of various organizations. There are more 
systems to attack as well as more systems from which to launch an attack. These attacks 
take advantage of the flaws or omissions that exist within the various operating systems 
and software that run on the many hosts in the network. The relative dearth of 
knowledgeable, seasoned administrators, anything that maximizes their ability to work 
on projects and minimizes their need to perform tedious tasks should result in increased 
productivity within the organization. Hence, with the deployment of an integrated 
intranet-based security suite can help any company achieve both these goals. 
 
What comprises an intranet-based security suite? It is defined as a set of 
applications that work in concert to provide a unified security solution. Such a suite 
encompasses products from the following categories: intrusion detection (NUSNSG 
Security Suite has its very own, File Intrusion Detection System or FIDS), registry 
scanning, and audit logging. Furthermore, it should leverage existing services for 







1.1 Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
 
As a response to increased threats, many intrusion detection systems (IDSs) 
have been developed to serve as a last line of defense in the overall protection scheme 
of a computer system. 
 
An intrusion occurs when someone attempts to break into or misuse a system. 
The word "misuse" is broad, and can reflect something such as altering data on the 
system or even injecting virus to the system. An IDS is a system for detecting such 
intrusions. 
 
In order for IDSs to detect intrusions, they have to collect information from a 
variety of systems and network sources, and then analyze the information for symptoms 
of security problems. Intrusion detection is considered by many to be the logical 
complement to network firewalls, extending the security management capabilities of 
system administrators to include security audit, monitoring, attack recognition, and 
active response [1-1]. 
 
When an intruder attacks a system, the ideal response would be to stop his 
activity before he can do any damage or access sensitive information. This would 
require recognition of the attack as it takes place in real time. There are few automated 
methods to perform this recognition. Most real-time methods are applied manually by 
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human observation by explicitly looking for the attack as a result of previous analysis or 
due to some triggering event of suspicious behavior, probably recognized by blind luck. 
Intrusion detection stresses the need to identify-preferably in real time-attempts 
to breach security and to assess the damage they have caused. An IDS constantly works 
away in the background in the system, notifying the user only when it detects 
something it considers suspicious or illegal. 
 
Intrusion detection system can basically be classified under five categories, 
network intrusion detection system (NIDS), host-based IDS, hybrid IDS, distributed 
IDS and log file monitors (LFM). 
 
1.1.1 Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) 
 
NIDS deals with information passing on the wire between hosts. Typically 
referred to as "packet-sniffers", network intrusion detection devices intercept packets 
traveling along various communication mediums and protocols, usually TCP/IP. Once 
captured, the packets are analyzed in a number of different ways. Some NID devices 
will simply compare the packet to a signature database consisting of known attacks and 
malicious packet "fingerprints", while others will look for anomalous packet activity 
that might indicate malicious behavior. It thus makes use of a system integrity verifier 




System Integrity Verifiers (SIV) 
 
SIV monitors system files to find when an intruder changes them. The most 
famous of such systems is "Tripwire". A SIV may watch other components as well, 
such as the Windows registry, in order to find well-known signatures. Many existing 
products in this area should be considered more "tools" than complete "systems": i.e. 
something like "Tripwire" detects changes in critical system components, but does not 
generate real-time alerts upon an intrusion. The File Intrusion Detection System (FIDS) 
developed in the NUSNSG Security Suite is modeled very closely after the SIV. 
 
Intrusion Detection Technology 
 
The FIDS is modeled closely after Tripwire [1-2]. Tripwire is a commercial tool 
that provides file integrity assessment, useful for detecting the effects of an intrusion. 
Tripwire creates a database of critical system file information that includes file lengths 
and cryptographic checksums based on each file’s contents. Tripwire compares current 
information with a previously generated baseline and identifies changed files. Tripwire 
will report modified files, but the user must decide whether the modifications resulted 
from an intrusion. Because most monitored files are not expected to change except 





1.1.2 Host-based IDS 
 
Host-based IDS are designed to monitor, detect, and respond to user and system 
activities and attacks on a given host. A host-based IDS looks only at packets addressed 
to the computer on which it resides and watches processes inside the host. The 
difference between host-based and network-based intrusion detection is that network 
intrusion detection deals with data transmitted from host to host while host intrusion 
detection is concerned with what occurs on the hosts themselves. 
 
Some host-based IDSs may operate entirely independently. In other systems, 
each host-based IDS may report to a master system that evaluates their reports. This 
architecture would be a hybrid IDS. 
 
1.1.3 Hybrid IDS 
 
Hybrid intrusion detection systems offer management of and alert notification 
from both network and host-based intrusion detection devices. Hybrid solutions provide 
the logical complement to NID and HID - central intrusion detection management. 
 
1.1.4 Distributed IDS 
 
In distributed IDS, detection software is placed throughout the network, 
specifically on hosts that are to be monitored. An assigned central controller is 
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responsible for the collection of periodically generated information on each host to 
detect any intrusion in the host. This provides an efficient mechanism of detecting 
intrusions in several hosts and at the same time keeping the analysis and recording 
process solely in the hands of a centralize controller. 
 
1.1.5 Log File Monitors (LFM) 
 
The last group of IDS monitors logs files generated by various network services.  
In similar manner to NIDS, these systems look for patterns in the log files that suggest 




1.2 Identifying Intrusions 
 
There are two general approaches for identifying intrusions, namely knowledge 
based and statistical based identifications. 
 
1.2.1 Knowledge-based Intrusion Detection 
 
IDSs that adopt this approach are also referred to as Expert Systems or 
Signature-based IDSs.  They rely on known signatures to recognize attacks and can 
employ many different techniques to identify intrusion patterns or signatures. 
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An example would be monitoring of keystrokes and comparing it with a 
database of known keystroke patterns that are known to be threats. 
 
1.2.2 Statistically-based Intrusion Detection 
 
This approach is to compare current statistics with that during normal usage.  
Any deviations would indicate an intrusion [1-3].  They are also known as Behavior-
Based or Anomaly Detection Systems.  Such systems do not rely on a pre-defined set of 
attack signatures and hence less dependent on operating system specific mechanism. 
 
The main disadvantage of such systems is the high number of false alarms that 
is caused by the fact that it considers any activity that is new or different to be a threat, 
hence not effective.  It has been demonstrated that the false alarm rate is the limiting 




1.3 Types of Intrusions 
 
The two types of intrusion corresponding to the methods of detection as 




1.3.1 Misuse Intrusions 
 
Misuse attacks are well defined attacked that exploit some vulnerability in the 
system hardware or software to gain unauthorized access.  Such intrusion can be 
detected using the signature-based approach by scrutinizing the system audit logs for an 
associated pattern. 
 
1.3.2 Anomaly Intrusions 
 
Anomaly intrusions are detected using statistical-based approach.  This implies that 
such intrusions result from changes in some usage pattern that can be obtained by 
carrying out user profiling.  Profiling is a process of recording the usage pattern of a 
user under normal circumstances to determine a profile of the user.  Some of the events 
that can be used for profiling include: 
 
• Mistyping 
• Interval between keystrokes 
• Typing speed 
• Mouse events 
• Computer usage statistics 




1.4 File Intrusion Detection System (FIDS) 
 
The proposed FIDS deployed in the NUSNSG Security Suite is based on the 
distributed real-time monitoring of the network file system within a local area network 
(intranet). The FIDS performs real time monitoring of hosts (or sometimes known as 
agents) in a local area network (LAN) by an assigned management server as shown in 
Figure 1.A. This configuration is similar to the hybrid model in the sense that all 
analysis processes and notification are done on the management server. Audit records 
are kept for analysis of patterns of attacks. The SIV model is implemented for the 
scanning process. The management server detects any unauthorized modification to the 
file systems of hosts present in the LAN through periodical scan initiated by the server 
and informs the security manager in real time. A modified PGP based protocol was also 
integrated to provide for a secure communication channel between the hosts and 
management server, providing for confidentially and integrity of data transferred across 
the network. 
N e tw o rk
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FIGURE 1.A: A Network Management System. 
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1.4.1 Objectives of FIDS 
 
The following objectives have been proposed and implemented for FIDS [1-5]: 
• The management server dynamically receives information from the host. 
• The management server responds to suspicious or real time attack by recovering 





1.5 Security Policies 
 
The security policy can be described as a series of statements that articulate the 
goals and procedures of the NUSNSG network.  It also defines the acceptable levels of 
information security. The five elements that need to be addressed by any policies to 






¾ Access Control 
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 In general, a security policy serves as a central document that describes in detail 
acceptable activities and penalties for misuse.  It is a set of rules and procedures that 




Confidentiality refers to the ability to keep relevant information secret and 
protected from unauthorized access.  Encryption is the primary means to keep 
information secret.  In a network environment, it becomes necessary to encrypt at least 
all data used for authentication to prevent unauthorized detection and tempering.  The 
obvious solution is to encrypt all traffic, which would increase cost and degrade 




Integrity of information relates to the accuracy or correctness of data.  It requires 
preventive measures to protect data from corruption.  Most method available to deal 




Availability may be impacted by a denial of service attack.  This occurs when an 
unauthorized attack on a system to preoccupy it with unproductive processes and 
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denying legitimate users the productive use of the system. A trusted system will offer 




Authentication is a way of uniquely identifying a user, machine or application 
and verifying their identities.  It is the basis for authorization and a fundamental 
requirement for access control and audit.  Different approaches can be implemented 




Access control provides a means of enforcing authorization to use system 
resources.  It is based upon an identification mechanism accompanied by an 
authentication mechanism.  Authorization can be based on time dependency, data 
classification, role or function of a user, type of transaction and type of service request. 
 
1.5.1 Fundamentals of Security Policies 
 
In order to have to implement an effective security suite, its security policies must 
have the following characteristics: 
¾ Consistent with other corporate policies. 
¾ Accepted by network support staff as well as the suitable levels of management. 
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¾ Enforceable using existing networks equipment and procedures. 




The overall theme of the security policy should reflect the network’s views on 
security and acceptable corporate practices in general.  If an organization wishes to 
enforce strict network access policy, it would also have to take the same stance towards 




The appropriate authorities in an organization must accept a policy before it can 




A security policy must be enforceable, to be of any good.  An example to 
illustrate this would be to state that users are required to change login password every 
ninety days.  This would be effective only if system is able to detect and lock accounts 
that failed to adhere to the policy.  Otherwise, an impression that ignoring the policy is 





It is important that the legal professional reviews the policy before they are 
implemented.  An issue or even the entire policy may have to be disregarded if it is 




A good security policy should have the following attributes: 
¾ Be readily accessible to all in the organization and define a clear set of goals. 
¾ Accurately define each issue discussed in the policy. 
¾ Clearly show the organization’s position on each issue. 
¾ Describe the justification of the policy regarding each issue. 
¾ Define under what circumstances the issue is applicable. 
¾ State the roles and responsibilities of organizational members with regards to 
the described issue. 
¾ Spell out the consequences of non-compliance with the described policy. 
¾ Provide contact information for further details or classification regarding the 
described issue. 
¾ Define the user’s expected level of privacy. 
¾ Include the organization’s stance on issues not specifically defined. 
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Chapter 2A: File Intrusion Detection System (FIDS) 
 
The structure of the File Intrusion Detection System (FIDS) in the NUSNSG 
Security Suite is based on the centralized real-time monitoring of the network file 
system within a local area network. A predefined management server will be present in 
the network, which will perform the real time monitoring on agents in the network. The 
agents present in the network can be normal servers performing any functions in that 
network such as web server or mail server. 
 
The management server will contain a pre-installed comprehensive database of 
backup files of all the agents. The selection of the set of backup files present in the 
management server will be left to the discretion of the security manager (SM). Once the 
management server detects any malicious attack of any agent’s file system within the 
network, a series of corrective actions will be performed automatically or with 
accordance to the SM’s decision. 
 
Due to the importance of the role that the management server performs and the 
amount of critical and confidential information present on the management server, 
access to this server will be restricted solely to the security manager. Thus at no time 
should the security of the management server be compromised and chances of an attack 
on the management server are assumed to be remote. The set of policies that the FIDS 
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adopt and the details of all the remedies that the management server will execute upon 
attack will be discussed in the following sections. 
 
2A.1 File Path Structure 
 
The management server will have an identical set of files (and in the same 
directory structure) to each of the agents in the network it is managing. This is 
necessary as the management server will be responsible for replacing any files on the 
agent that are being intruded with the original files. Thus a systematic set of file 
structure in the FIDS must be in place to ensure that retrieving of files from the 
management server for replacement on the agent does not require a complicated 
process. 
 
The path for a fictitious file ‘security.ini’ on the management server and its 
equivalent file found on the NUSNSG network agent, NUSNS2, are stated in Table 
2AA. This file will appear in the ‘\NUSNSG\Clients\Nusns2\security’ directory in the 
management server and ‘\security’ root directory in the host. This format of file storage 
facilitates file retrieval by providing a systematic way of locating the file in the 
management server. This is done since the management server has to monitor more than 
one host in the NUSNSG network and there must be host member directories 
specifically allocated in the management server for each host in the network. 
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File path on management server C:\NUSNSG\Clients\Nusns2\security\security.ini 
Equivalent (identical) file path on 
NUSNSG host NUSNS2 
C:\security\security.ini 
TABLE 2A.A: File path for security.ini in the management server and host, NUSNS2. 
When the management server detects a file intrusion during a file scan, and 
knowing the file path of the intruded file on the host as well as the host name, the 
management server will be able to retrieve the original file from its local drive by 
looking up the folder with the host name. Once the file is successfully retrieved, it can 
be sent through the network to replace the intruded file at the host. This process is 


















FIGURE 2A.A: File Retrieval Process in Management Server. 
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2A.2 Files Selection and Classification 
 
In order to monitor the files on a particular host, the SM must first has the 
ability to select what are the files on the host that are to be monitored. The FIDS 
provides the facilities for the SM to select the hosts as well as the files that are to be 
monitored over at the management server. The program is constructed to enable the SM 
to make the selections at the management server and determine the monitored files for 
each host in the NUSNSG network. Thus the SM will have the luxury of selecting the 
files to be monitored on different hosts remotely, without having to go down physically 
to the different hosts. This facility is particularly useful for network that spreads over 
large geographical area. 
 
The files to be monitored are classified as either critical or non-critical. Once the 
SM had indicated the hosts as well as the files or folder to be monitored, he will be 




2A.3 Initiating Scan 
 
The SM over at the management server end will initiate the start of the scan. 
The FIDS provides a window (the graphical user interface will be discussed in depth in 
chapter 4) for the SM to select the hosts he wants to monitor. After selecting the hosts, a 
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scan interval will have to be specified in the window. This scan interval indicates the 
interval between the end of a scan and the beginning of the next scan. 
 
Simply monitoring a single host in the network will not be useful as most 
networks usually consists of more than one host. Threading (Chapter 7) was thus used 




2A.4 Starting the File Scan Process 
 
Starting the scanning process on a particular agent will trigger a series of 
handshaking communications between the management server and the host and 
consequently a file(s) exchange whenever intrusions are detected. This is facilitated by 
initiating a TCP/IP-based communication channel with the host by the management 
server (the exact protocol used in the host server communication will be discussed in 
detail in Chapters 3 and 4). 
 
Once a communications channel between the server and host is established, the 
management server will send the information containing the host’s FIDS monitored 
files to that host. By reading the content of this information, the host will know what are 
the files to be scanned in the host’s local drive. A software component installed in the 
host, called the FIDSClientScanThread, that was previously activated, will scan the 
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files with respect to the FIDS monitored files information retrieved from the 
management server. The Message Digest codes (discussed in the further detail in the 




2A.5 Message Digest (MD5) 
 
Professor Ronald L. Rivest of MIT developed the Message Digest, also better 
known as the MD5. From the executive summary of RFC1321 [2A-1]: 
 
The MD5 algorithm takes as input a message of arbitrary length and produces as 
output a 128-bit "fingerprint" or "message digest" of the input. It is conjectured that it 
is computationally infeasible to produce two messages having the same message digest, 
or to produce any message having a given prespecified target message digest. 
 
In essence, MD5 is a way to verify data integrity, and is much more reliable 
than checksum and many other commonly used methods. Professor Rivest’s original 
implementation of the MD5 algorithm is included in the appendix of RFC1321 [2A-1], 
and in the NUSNSG Security Suite, the MD5 algorithm is implemented in the JAVA 
programming language, which is also the language of choice in the software 
implementation of this project for most of its other components. 
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Basically, what MD5 does in the NUSNSG Security Suite is for the verification 
of file integrity in the Suite’s FIDS division. It derives a 128-bit message digest 
“fingerprint” of a file to be monitored in any of the clients in the NUSNSG network and 
keeps it as a reference record for scanning for any file content changes at the next 
monitoring interval. Any changes discovered by the FIDS component (by recomputing 
the message digest), will yield a markedly different “fingerprint”, and this information 
can be used to indicate an intrusion to the affected file contents (this is so even if the 
file size remained constant!). 
 
The file message digest “fingerprint” is a fixed-length result of a one-way hash 
of the contents in the monitored file, similar to a cryptographic checksum or cyclic 
redundancy check (CRC). This is a one-way hash, as you cannot recover the original 
file contents from its digest. This can be easily seen given an example: there are literally 
an infinite number of wildly different file contents that can be composed, each of 
differing lengths and content, but the digest itself is limited to a fixed-length, therefore 
it contains less information than is needed to reconstruct a file. So for each fixed-length 
digest, there are an infinite number of file contents that share that digests, but they are 
not similar (due to the quality of the cryptographic function within the hashing 






2A.5.1 Software Implementation: Obtaining the MD5 code 
 
In the FIDS division of the NUSNSG Security Suite, MD5 computation from a 
monitored file is done as follows, based from the java.security class: 
 
1) Obtain the file contents as a byte array. The bytes are read from the FileInputStream 
into the ByteArrayOutputStream. 
 
2) Get a MessageDigest for the MD5 algorithm. The digest’s buffer is verified that it is 
empty and is consequently filled with data to compute the message digest from the 
‘update’ method from the MessageDigest object. 
 
3) Next, calling the ‘digest’ method generates the digest. The 16-byte digest is then 
stored into a Vector for file monitoring in the next scanning interval. 
 
Part of the MD5 generation code is shown below (extracted from 
FIDSNetworkClient component): 
 
MessageDigest md5Digest1 = MessageDigest.getInstance("MD5"); 
 
FileInputStream fis1 = new FileInputStream(fileelement1); 
File fileentry1 = new File(fileelement1); 
long filesize1 = fileentry1.length(); 
int theByte1 = 0; 
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 + "#" + theMsgDigest1[0] 
 + "#" + theMsgDigest1[1] 
 + "#" + theMsgDigest1[2] 
 + "#" + theMsgDigest1[3] 
 + "#" + theMsgDigest1[4] 
 + "#" + theMsgDigest1[5] 
 + "#" + theMsgDigest1[6] 
 + "#" + theMsgDigest1[7] 
 + "#" + theMsgDigest1[8] 
 + "#" + theMsgDigest1[9] 
 + "#" + theMsgDigest1[10] 
 + "#" + theMsgDigest1[11] 
 + "#" + theMsgDigest1[12] 
+ "#" + theMsgDigest1[13] 
+ "#" + theMsgDigest1[14] 






2A.6 FIDS Detection Mechanism 
 
The FIDS looks out for three types of file intrusion, unauthorized file deletion, 
file content change and file addition. Three independent algorithms are implemented to 





2A.7 FIDS Security Policies 
 
Different security policies are employed on the appropriate actions to take upon 
the detection of file intrusion in hosts. The policies will very much depend on the type 
of intrusion and the classification of the intruded file. 
 
2A.7.1 Policies for File Deletion and File Content Change 
 
On the detection of any file deletion or file content change in any of the hosts on 
the network, the FIDS will perform the same set of action to rectify the intrusion. The 
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actions perform by the FIDS depends on the classification of the files by the security 




Upon the detection of any critical files deletion or files content change, the 
management server will immediately send the original copy of the file from its local 
machine to replace the affected file on the host. Since the security manager had stated 
the file to be critical, replacing such files in real time is crucial in maintaining the 




On the other hand, if non-critical files in the host are deleted or changed, they 
will not be replaced with the original from the management server immediately. A 
message will be sent to the management server, informing it that the file on that host 
had been changed or deleted. Subsequently, the security manager will decide to allow 







2A.7.2 Policies for File Addition 
 
In another scenario, where a file addition was detected in an agent computer, a 
message will be sent to the management server for the security manager to decide 
whether to authorize the addition. 
 







































2A.8 FIDS Actions (Security Manager) 
 
It was mentioned that the original files from the management server would 
replace those critical files that are deleted or changed immediately. For non-critical 
files, notification of file deletion or changes will be generated. File addition will also 
generate such a message. Upon notification at management server, the security manager 





Choosing the restore setting will effectively restore the agent to the state before 
it had been intruded. This option will send the original files from the management 
server to that agent for the case of a file deletion or content change. For the case of a 
file addition, the restore option will send an instruction to the agent requesting for the 




By opting to replace settings, the security actually authorizes the non-critical file 
deletion, content change and also the addition of file on the host. Replace action will 
trigger a series of updates on the management server. A backup copy of the new 
additional file will be placed in the management server. Deleted files will also be 
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removed from the management server’s collection. And content-changed files will be 
replaced with these in the server’s collection. All these are necessary so that the 




2A.9 FIDS Audit Logging Features 
 
The FIDS division in the NUSNSG Security Suite provides the facility of audit 
logging at the server. Information regarding attacks on hosts is logged into the 
FIDSserverlog table of the FIDSlog database at the management server. This table will 
be common to all the hosts in the network and thus all attacks on different hosts will be 
entered into the same logging table. Audit logging will be useful in analyzing patterns 
of attacks and thus helps in predicting future attacks. Greater details of audit logging 
will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 2B: NUSNSG Intrusion Detection System (NNIDS) 
 
The NNIDS is another IDS developed in the NUSNSG Security Suite that uses a 
dedicated system to centrally process data and detect intrusion via information sent to it 
from the various hosts.  This remove the need for individual hosts to perform data 
analysis, hence minimizes duplication.  Efficiency of the hosts would also be increased. 
The general architecture of the NNIDS division (which is somewhat similar to FIDS) is 

















FIGURE 2B.A: Architecture of the NNIDS. 
 
 
The management server’s role in the NNIDS is essentially the servers’ server.  It 
runs continuously waiting for data to be sent from hosts, analyses them and determine 
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the appropriate actions to take base on a set of signatures. The hosts will have a simple 
module, known as Agent, to collect relevant data, package and transfer it securely via 
the network to the SM for analysis. 
 
A customized secure network protocol based on the popular Simple Network 
Management Protocol (SNMP) is used for data communication between the 
management server and hosts.  Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) is being employed to 




2B.1 Introduction to NNIDS 
 
The system comprises two main modules. An Agent and Manager modules run 
on the host and server respectively.  Both applications run continuously once they are 
started.  Figure 2B.B shows the flowchart of the system. 
 
COLLECTION OF DATA AT AGENT 
V 
DATA SENDING TO MANAGER 
V 
MANAGER ARCHIVES LOG DATA 
V 
MANAGER ANALYSES LOG DATA 
V 
MANAGER DETERMINES REMEDIAL ACTIONS 
 
FIGURE 2B.B: NNIDS flow chart. 
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2B.2 NNIDS Agent Overview 
 
The Agent running on the host continuously monitors its Security Event Log to 
detect the occurrence of an event.  The event logging facilities are provided by the 
Windows NT Operating System. 
 
Whenever Windows NT records a new security event, the Agent checks the Event 
Identifier (Event ID) and extracts only the following relevant information from the 
event record: 
 
1) Event ID 
2) Event Type 
3) Event Category 
4) Event Date (Day, Month, Year) 
5) Event Time (Hour, Minute, Second) 
6) User ID 
7) Computer Name (client) 
 
These data are formatted and stored into a text file to be transported over to the 







FIGURE 2B.C: Contents of event.txt file. 
 
 
2B.3 NNIDS Manager Overview 
 
The Manager loops continuously to check for the arrival and presence of a new 
event log file from the Agent module of any host.  Once a new event is detected, it 
stores the data from the event.txt file into a buffer for analysis. 
 
Analysis of the event log is based on known signatures determined by the policy 
definition for the system.  The policy definition (discussed in the next section) would 
define the events to be monitored, the signature generated by the occurring events and 
how the system should react according to the event and signature detected. 
 
The management server also archives the event logs by appending the data from 
the buffer into another text file named Master.txt and transferring the contents regularly 
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into the database table, NNIDSserverlog, belongs to the FIDSlog database (see Chapter 
6).  This data can be used for long-term behavioral analysis using statistical methods.  





FIGURE 2B.D: Contents of master.txt file 
 
Applications can also be developed to extract the data for management 
reporting, enhancement to security policy definition and detection of wrong security 







2B.4 NNIDS Policy Definitions 
 
The functions of NUSNSG Intrusion Detection System were developed based 
on the policies defined in this section. 
 
Event Log Cleared (ID 517) 
 
Detection: Event Log Cleared 
Description: To verify that action is made only by Security Manager (SM). 
Action: Monitor the Security Event Log entry for Event Identification 
517 where the user name is other than the SM.  Inform SM 
immediately via SMS and shutdown Server due to criticality 
of the event.  
 
Audit Policy Changed (ID 612) 
 
Detection: Audit Policy Changed 
Description: To verify that change is made only by Security Manager 
(SM). 
Action: Monitor the Security Event Log entry for Event 
Identification 612 where the user name is other than the 
SM.  Inform SM immediately via SMS and shutdown 
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Server due to criticality of incident.  
 
Account Locked Out (ID 539) 
 
Detection: Account Locked Out. 
Description: Accounts are locked out when a defined number of 
unsuccessful login attempts occur.   
Action: Monitor the Security Event Log entry for Event 
Identification 539 and record events for analysis.  Inform 
SM via Email as user is no longer able to access into 
system.  
 
Logon Failure (ID 529) 
 
Detection: Logon Failure. 
Description: Multiple logon failure events within a short period of time 
indicate a possible attempted intrusion.  
Action: Monitor the Security Event Log entry for Event 
Identification 529.  If the number of attempts from a 
workstation over a period of two (2) minutes is three(3) 
times, disable the account and inform SM via SMS.  
 
 35 
Logon Time Violation (ID 530) 
 
Detection: Logon Time Violation. 
Description: Detect and record logon failures due to time restriction 
violation.  Frequent attempts by user suggest possible 
misuse of system. 
Action: Monitor the Security Event Log entry for Event 
Identification 530 and record events for analysis.  Inform 
SM via Email as user is unable to login to cause damage 
due to security restriction in place.  
 
Successful Logon, Logoff (ID 528, 538) 
 
Detection: Successful Logon, Logoff. 
Description: Record all successful logons and logoffs of every user.  
Can be used to analyze usage pattern. 
Action: Monitor the Security Event Log entry for Event 
Identification 528 and 538.  Record events for further  





Object Deleted (ID 564) 
 
Detection: Object Deleted. 
Description: Critical files and object can be monitored to detect 
unauthorized use.   
Action: Monitor the Security Event Log entry for Event 
Identification 564 and record events for analysis.  Inform 




2B.5 NNIDS Agent and Manager Software Architecture 
 
The system comprises two main modules namely Agent and Manager.  The 
modules are discussed in detail in the following sections. 
 
2B.5.1 NNIDS Agent 
 
The Agent software runs on the host.  It runs continuously in the background 































Extract Event details and write to Event.txt 
Check for Defined Event ID  
Transfer Event.txt file to Server 
Wait for Occurrence of security event 
Create Thread 
 
FIGURE 2B.E: Flowchart of the NNIDS Agent Program. 
 
Agent will create a thread that will be notified when Windows NT Security 
Event Log is written to.  It makes requests of the event logging service by calling the 
various functions explained in Chapter 4 to perform the detection and reading of the 
security event log.  The API (Interface) Dynamic Link Library defines the functions and 
is used by the user-mode Win32 processes to access the security event log. 
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The Agent output data fields described in Section 2B.2 earlier are written to the 
Event.txt file shown in Figure 2B.C in the earlier section.  The date and time are 
separated into three fields for ease of analysis at the later stage.  The Event.txt file is 
stored in the same directory where the Agent software is launched. 
 
After the Agent has detected that a new event has been written into the security 
event log, it calls a function to read the details of the latest security event into the 
buffer. 
 
The next routine will have to determine which event was recorded so that the 
required details of User Login Name and Workstation Name can be extracted from the 
variable data string of the Event Record.  These fields are accessed via pointers with the 
offset values stored in the Event Record.  The location of these fields varies from one 
event to another. 
 
The overall design architecture calls for a secured mode of communication 
between the Agent and the Manager.  Therefore, the communications are based on 
SNMP protocol that facilitates the exchange of management information between 
network devices. 
 
SNMP is vulnerable to security threats because of its lack of authentication.  
Hence a customized SNMP protocol with the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) as an added 
security function is needed.  PGP is a public key encryption program that has received 
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wide support all over the world.  It has become a de-facto standard for encryption of 
email on the Internet. A modified form of PGP that was developed to achieve security 
of message and file transfer packets is being used. 
 
2B.5.2 NNIDS Manager 
 
Like the Agent, the Manager program also runs continuously on the 
management server.  The flow chart of the Manager software is shown in Figure 2B.F. 
The Manager first check the presence of the Event.txt file and create one which indicate 
an old data, if there is none present in the directory that the Manager is started. It 
continues to check if the Event.txt file is a new entry by checking the Event ID data.  
This data will be over-written by “999” to indicate to subsequent passes that the file had 
been accessed before and content is not new. 
 
When a new Event.txt file is detected, the content will be copy into a buffer and 
the Event ID field on the Event.txt file will be replaced with “999”.  Data from the 
buffer will then be appended onto the Master.txt file that holds a consolidated list of 
events that have been recorded. 
 
The Master.txt file will be periodically accessed by the NNIDSlogDB server 
component (see Chapter 6) to transfer the data to a database format.  This will offer 
better flexibility and capability for new modules to be developed to perform more 
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Store content to buffer.  
Delay  
Copy content to Master.txt 








The most critical function of the Manager is to analyze the data and take 
appropriate actions.  The details are discussed in the following section. 
 
 
2B.5.3 Analysis and Detection Function 
 
This function performs the intrusion detection checks based on the security 
definition defined in Section 2B.4. It checks for occurrence of events with particular 
signatures and initiate appropriate actions.  Sub-modules can be added as and when it 
becomes necessary to enhance and improve performance of the system. 
 




 If ( (Event ID = (517 || 612) ) and (User Name != “Administrator”) )    
  Shutdown Server & SMS SA. 
  Else If (Event ID = 539 || 530),  
  Email SA. 
 Else If (Event ID = 529) and (Number of tries within 2 min = 3),   
  SMS SA. 
 Else If (Event ID = 564),   /* For critical files only */ 
  Logoff User & SMS SA. 
 Else If (Event ID = 528 || 538 ),  
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FIGURE 2B.G: Algorithm for the Analysis and Detection Module. 
 
This module runs each time a new event is detected and information is passed to 
the Manager from the Agent.  It performs real time analysis of the data from each event 
and determines the necessary action. 
 
When a particular signature is detected, the Manager will call for the necessary 
actions by sending an appropriate code and associated message to two text files namely 
Code.txt and Alertinstruct.txt.  The latter has to be created prior to the generation of the 
Code.txt file.  This is necessary for the Manager to integrate with yet another module in 
the NUSNSG Security Suite. 
 
Code.txt file contains a single number for the companion module to read and 
activate the required actions to Shutdown server, Logoff user, Disable Account, etc.  







FIGURE 2B.H: Code.txt file. 
 
The Alertinstruct.txt file shown in Figure 2B.I is to store the necessary 
information that will be sent to the SM via one of the selected method.  SMS is used for 










2B.6 The Operating System – WINDOWS NT 
 
Microsoft launched Windows NT operating system in 1993.  Based on a 32-bit 
architecture, it offers many advanced features like multi-tasking, multithreaded, high 
availability, resource sharing, etc., and has been adopted by many organizations as a 
platform to deploy host-server applications. 
 
Prior to Windows NT, accessing network resources used to be an exhaustive 
process.  A different password has to be used for every resource like a file server or a 
printer. 
 
Windows NT avoided this by using the concept of Domain.  A user would be 
granted appropriate access to resource across the entire network once he is logged on to 
an NT machine participating in a domain.  Network administration can be managed 
centrally for all users through the use of NT administration utility that also provides 




One of the principal design goals of Windows NT was to make it as secure as 
possible without significantly hindering its ability [2B-4].  Security has been designed 
into every aspect of the system from the beginning of the operating system design, 
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including its user interface.  Both Windows NT Servers and Workstations have 
common security architecture and a similar set of security features. 
 
Windows NT comes with extremely robust security built into its operating 
system at the lowest and most fundamental level [2B-5]. The security cannot be turned 
off and anything that a user did would be subjected to some sort of security check. 
Computer and data are protected by controlling who can use the computer, by limiting 
how someone can use it, and by monitoring how someone use it. 
 
The general security guidelines for implementing Windows NT includes [2B-1]: 
 
¾ Minimum monthly changes to user password. 
¾ User account is locked for 15 minutes after three successive failed logon 
attempts. 
¾ Keep history of 13 passwords, requiring unique passwords to be generated. 
¾ Set minimum password change interval to at least one day to prevent quick 
“change back”. 
¾ Rename default Windows NT accounts created during installations so that 
system does not have a standard user name for hacker to target. 
¾ Set appropriate file permissions. 
¾ Remove “everyone” access from all file directories. 
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2B.6.2 C2 Certification 
 
Windows NT is rated at a C2 security level; a security class defined by the U.S. 
National Computer Security Center in a document called “The Trusted Computer 
System Evaluation Criteria.  It is better known as the Orange Book because of the color 
of its cover. The security classifications as defined in the Orange Book are shown in 
Appendix A. 
 
2B.6.3 Security Features 
 
The three important security features are Security Identifier (SID), Windows NT 
File System (NTFS) and Auditing. 
 
 
 Security Identifier (SID) 
 
Most fundamental part of Windows NT security is the user account.  From this, 
NT creates a unique SID.  Other entities like local groups, domains, etc. also have 






FIGURE 2B.J: Typical SIDs of Windows NT. 
 
The generic format of SID is as follows: 
S - Revision Level – Identifier Authority – Sub Authority 
SID enables access to designated resources. 
 
NT File System (NTFS) 
 
NTFS provides full security access control to objects.  This security feature is 
the most important improvement over traditional file systems. 
 
Every object either a file or directory has a security descriptor that holds 
security information associated with it.  Any request to access an object in the NTFS is 
subjected to a security test.  The identity and privileges of the user are compared to the 
access permissions on the security descriptor before access is granted or denied. 
 
Access Control List (ACL) 
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 Windows NT uses access control list to limit the access of users to resources.  It 
is used primarily in cooperation with the Windows NT file system.  The access control 




Auditing is the process by which NT records various security and related events 
that occur on a computer system.  It is not only useful for detecting hacking or misuse, 
but also provides information on how a system is being used and by whom. 
 
Windows NT implement security auditing through the use of its event-logging 
service that records system events which affect the computer’s security.  This is the 
basis on which the intrusion detection system is built. 
 
 
2B.6.4 Event Logging 
 
Event logging is a facility used by computer systems to record the occurrence of 
significant events.  Monitoring the occurrence of designated events and providing 
appropriate actions to expel the intrusions can develop an intrusion detection system. 
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Windows NT server records events that affect system components, security and 
applications.  This is done by the event logging service that operates invisibly in the 
background and waits for processes running on the system to send it reports of events 
[2B-2]. 
 
2B.6.4.1 Event Logs 
 
Windows NT has a detailed and complete security auditing system.  It follows a 
multi-log strategy by having three logs to categorize events based on the source of the 
event reports.  The event logs are: 
 
Security Log: Contains events generated by the system security and auditing processes. 
 
System Log: Contains reports from system processes and kernel-mode device drivers. 
 
Application Log: Contains events reported by user-mode applications and MS-DOS 
console programs. 
2B.6.4.2 Security Log 
 
Events that are reported in the security log are selected by the auditing policy 
determined by the system administrators.  It is very often referred to as the audit log 
because it is the central repository for security auditing records on all NT systems. 
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The audit facilities can be enabled to capture seven classes of events in the 
security log as listed in Table 2BA. 
 
 
Category ID Description 
1 System Event 
2 Logon/Logoff 
3 Object Access 
4 Privileged Use 
5 Detailed Tracking 
6 Policy Change 
7 Account Management 
 
 
TABLE 2B.A: Event Categories of the NT Security Log. 
 
 
The most significant category “Object Access”, enable auditing to be set for 
each file and directory access to generate an event based on user names, groups and 
success or failure.  A complete list of security events with their data strings [2B-3] is 




2B.6.4.3 Event Viewer 
 
The application provided by Windows NT for viewing and maintaining the 
event log is the Event Viewer.  It has limited features such as: 
 
¾ Selecting specific local and remote event logs. 
¾ Displaying event log data in record format. 
¾ Selectively filtering the display of log records. 
¾ Backing up event logs and displaying event log backup files. 
¾ Manually clearing event logs to reclaim disk space. 
¾ Setting log size and event record retention policy. 
¾ Starting multiple instances of Event Viewer. 
 




























































FIGURE 2B.L: Main Event Viewer Window 
 
2B.6.4.4 Event Logging API 
 
Windows NT event logs are accessed using the event logging API functions.  A 


















TABLE 2B.B: Event Logging API Functions. 
 
2B.6.4.5 EVENTLOGRECORD Data Type 
 
Each record in the event log contains a 56-byte header followed by several 
fixed-length and variable-length fields of data.  Figure 2B.M shows the structure of a 










Event Type Number of Strings 
Event Category Reserved Flags 
Closing Record Number 
String Offset 
User SID Length 











FIGURE 2B.M: Data Format of an Event Log Record. 
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Information of security events are extracted from these records and analyzed to 
detect possible intrusions. 
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Chapter 2C: NUSNSG Toolkit (or NNT) 
 
The third division in the NUSNSG Security Suite, the NUSNSG Toolkit (NNT) 
has been developed and included in the Suite to providing a registry-controlled 
environment in the NUSNSG network for the various hosts. Besides monitoring the file 
system and maintaining its integrity, there is also a need to look into other security 
aspects in the hosts that could be susceptible to security breaches. The NNT looks into 
the Windows Registry environment and scans for any unsafe settings. Should there be 
the presence of unsafe settings, remedial actions are executed in the host (by the 
management server, remotely) to alter the host’s Windows Registry to secured settings 




2C.1 Windows Registry 
 
The Windows Registry is a central repository of information about all aspects of 
the computer system – in particular, its hardware, operating system, applications and 
users. It can be accessed and updated under software control (such as in the case of the 
NUSNSG Security Suite) and also directly by users, which can be a security breach if 
these users are not authorized to do so. 
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2C.2 Registry Control (Windows NT) 
 
The NUSNSG Security Suite is deployed in a Windows NT environment. As 
such an effective security suite requires proper handling or control of the registry. This 
is because the Windows NT Registry plays a key role in making the operating system 
function properly. It serves as a central data repository, and it is involved in every task 
done with NT-based hosts, from the initial boot sequence to logging and run 
applications and services. Data is stored in a special format that can be read only with 
the tools and API routines Microsoft provides. The Registry provides a neat and tidy 
way for applications, device drivers, and kernel services to record configuration data. 
 
2C.2.1 Role of the Registry 
 
The chief role of the Registry in Windows NT is to be a repository for setting 
configuration data. System components can look for the data they need in the Registry 
and use what they find to control how they interact with other system components. 
 




Instead of the dozens of separate INI files typically found on a Windows 3.1 
machine, the Windows NT machine use the concept of centralizing, where 
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configuration information is stored makes it easier for administrator to back up, restore 




Access control for the Registry comes in various forms. You can set individual 
workstations or servers to disallow any remote Registry connection at all. As an 
additional security feature, NT allows you to create an audit trail of the access to, and 
operation on the Registry. When you enable auditing for a key, you specify two things: 
actions you want to be audited, and which accounts will be audited. The auditing data is 





Registry supports network inspection and modification. Network Registry 
makes it possible to automatically inspect the Registry of every machine on a network, 






















Any key in the Registry may have sub keys. Just as folders are contained inside 
other folders, these sub keys can in turn hold other sub keys, and so on down the line. A 










• Data type 
• Some contents 
 
2C.2.4 The Big Six 
 
These keys form the foundation upon which all the Registry’s capabilities lie. 
They provide a logical structure for grouping related items, and each of them plays a 




HKLM is responsible for consolidating and storing all the system-wide 
configuration data for a particular computer. HKLM includes the hardware 
configuration data, and holds settings for the computer’s network connections, security 
configuration, device driver setting and more. There are five major sub keys under 











HKU contains all the profile and environment settings for users on the local 
machine. These settings are made up of all the per-user-controls controllable by the 
System Policy Editor, user-specific environment variables, as well as user-specific 
software settings. 
 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER  (HKCU) 
 




HKCR serves as a giant look-up table that maps file extensions to the 





HKDD was originally introduced in Windows 95. It provides a central cleaning 
house for dynamic data that rebuilds anew each time the operating system starts up. In 
Windows 95, it stores performance data that the Performance Monitor can extract, plus 
a list of virtual device drivers. Under Windows NT 4.0 and later versions, when an 
application requests a sub key value for any of the HKDD’s sub keys, the NT kernel 
gathers the appropriate dynamic data, make a bogus sub key under HKDD, and passes it 
back to the requester as the data does not exist until it is requested. 
HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG (HKCC) 
 
HKCC is the center for data that concerns the computer’s current hardware 
configuration. 
 
2C.2.5 Access Controls and Security 
 
NT implements access control and security for the Registry in four overlapping 
bands.  
 
• Control via Registry APIs 
• Remote-access control 
• NT security controls 




2C.2.6 Registry Data Exchange 
 
You can make direct calls to the Win32 Registry API routines to move data in and out 
of the Registry. 
 
The basic process is fairly simple: you start by opening a key or sub key by its 
name. Once it is done, various things can be manipulated to that key or its sub keys. 
You can query its value, create new sub keys beneath it, or even query about its security 
settings. The key or sub key is then closed after manipulation. 
 
2C.2.7 Registry Security 
 
Like NTFS files, directories, and volumes, Registry keys can have attached 
attributes that control that owns them, who may read, write, and change them, and what 
events should be logged for further scrutiny. In particular, every key has an access 
control list, or ACL, associated with it. This ACL authorizes certain accounts to have 
certain types of access to the key. 
 
2C.2.8 Registry Tweaks 
 
The following are some Registry settings that can be used to change the way a 
computer (NT 4.0 machine) behaves. 
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File System Tweaks 
 
Suppress “Last Access” Timestamp on NTFS Volumes 
 
NTFS volumes store a “last access” timestamp for every file and directory on 
the volume. The NTFS driver automatically updates this timestamp every time a file is 
accessed for reading or writing. That means that every time you look at a directory 
listing, NT is busily updating the file timestamps. This is often a waste of CPU cycles 
and disk bandwidth that could be better used elsewhere. 
 
To prevent NT from maintaining the “last access” timestamp for NTFS 
volumes, add a REG_DWORD value named NtfsDisableLastAccessUpdate to the 
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem and set its value to 1. 
 





Clear the System Pagefile at Shutdown 
 
The U.S. government (National Computer Security Center) has established a 
rating system for computer operating system. This rating system rates how secure 
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operating systems are. To earn a particular rating, there are certain features that an 
operating system must implement. On of these features is object reuse. Object reuse 
means that objects (include disk blocks, memory, and other shared resources) are 
cleared out after use. This prevents any leakage of confidential data. 
 
As shipped, however, NT does not implement reuse on the virtual memory’s 
pagefile. A couple of publicized attacks rely on the fact that NT’s pagefile is left intact 
when the system shuts down; it can then be scanned for useful data. 
 
To prevent this, we can add the REG_DWORD value to the 
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\SessionManager\Memory 
Management\ClearPageFileAtShutdown value and set it to 1; this force NT to zero out 
the contents of the pagefile when system shutdown. 
 
Prevent Caching of Logon Credentials 
 
By default, Windows NT workstations will cache the last ten sets of logon 
credentials received from a domain controller. This reduces the number of times a 
workstation has to contact a domain controller for verification of a logon request, and it 
often makes it possible to log on to a domain even the domain controller is not available 
on the network. For a high-security network, to prevent this credentials from being 
cached add a REG_DWORD value named Cached Logons Count beneath the 
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HKLKM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\winlogon key. Its value is set 




Enable Automatic Reboot After a Crash 
 
When a Windows NT machine crashes, it produces a “Blue Screen of Death” 
(BSOD), which indicates the cause of the crash and gives some information about the 
system’s state when the crash happened. The problem with this approach is that the 
server “hangs”, with BSOD displayed, until the operating system is rebooted.  
 
In order to enable Windows NT to automatically reboot after a crash, the value 
of HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\CrashControl\AutoReboot is set to 1. This will 
make the system reboot automatically after writing out the crash log file. 
 
Record Evidence of a Crash 
 
Besides the standard crash dump file, you can also tell Windows NT to record 
the occurrence of a crash in two ways. First, the kernel can send an administrative alert 
to another machine; this alert may provide the first warning you get of a fresh crash. 
Secondly, the kernel can record a crash message in the event log. 
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Both of these capabilities are controlled by values under the 
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\CrashControl key. To turn on alert broadcasting, 
the SendAlert value is set to 1 instead of its default value of 0. Setting the LogEvent 
value to 1 will also turn on event log messages. 
 
Force Hung Tasks to End When Logging Off 
 
When you log off or shut down a Windows NT machine, the system scheduler 
will attempt to stop any running tasks. In addition to shutting down any drivers or 
services started by the system, NT must shut down 16-bit Windows subsystem and any 
application that was started by the user. It is common to see hung tasks in the VDM 
preventing the entire system from shutting down properly. 
 
NT’s normal response to this problem is to display a dialog that asks whether 
the shutdown or logoff is to be aborted, wait for the recalcitrant task to stop by itself, or 
kill off the task. This process can be automated by specifying that we want NT to go 
ahead and abort tasks that do not listen to shutdown requests. In order to enforce this 
shutdown, add a REG_SZ value named AutoEndTasks to HKEY_USER\<SID>\Control 




Enable the WINS Proxy Agent 
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 The Windows NT machine can act as Windows Internet Name Service (WINS) 
proxies; these proxies answer name resolution requests from machines (like 
Macintoshes or Unix machines) that do not speak the WINS protocol. In Windows NT 
4.0, the only way to enable this proxy mode is via Registry changes. 
 
To turn a machine into a WINS proxy, add a new REG_DWORD value named 
KLM\Syatem\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netbt\Parameters\EnableProxy and give it a 
value of 1. This will enable the target machine to route WINS resolution requests to an 




Chapter 3: NUSNSG Client Components 
 
Each of the host computers in the NUSNSG network is installed with the 
NUSNSG Security Suite host software that facilitates the application of NUSNSG 
security policies in the intranet domain. This enables the security management server to 
communicate with the individual computers and enable the exchange of intrusion and 






The NUSNSGClient host software acts as a “listening” daemon program that 
awaits the security management server for scanning instructions and commands. It is 
used to manage the three divisions of the NUSNSG Security Suite, namely File 
Intrusion Detection System (FIDS), NUSNSG Intrusion Detection System (NNIDS) 
and NUSNSG Toolkit (NNT). 
 
3.1.1 The Program Module 
 
NUSNSGClient has been coded in JAVA and functions in the form of a DOS 
console window. As it resides on the host end, no information is presented on the 
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console window since such actions are inappropriate in host computers where intrusion 
activities are probable. The program is also run as a Windows NT service, so as to give 
the Security Manager (SM) control over the execution of such programs. Users 
(excluding the SM) are not able to start or stop the program. In this way the integrity of 
the program is preserved and security-management activities can be carried out without 
foreign intervention. 
 
3.1.2 The Program Flow 
 
The NUSNSGClient host software consists of four components running concurrently 











 3.2 FIDSClientScanThread 
The component function of FIDSClientScanThread is shown in the following 
Table 3.A and described in the proceeding sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.5. 

















































INFORMATION: <CRITICAL FILES AUDIT LOGGING> 
 
 
TABLE 3.A: FIDSNetworkClient flow chart. 
 
 
3.2.1 FIDSClientThread Handshaking Protocol 
 
A TCP/IP socket communication mechanism has been adopted for 
FIDSClientThread and the participating server’s component on the security 
management server. Two separate port numbers are engaged for the FIDS protocol 
handshaking communications, and critical file transfers respectively. FIDSClientThread 
upon activated as a component in the NUSNSG network continuously “listens” to 
handshaking port for any message commands originating from the security management 
server. It seeks to look out for the server’s first message command “SETTING UP 
FIDS COMMUNICATIONS”. When this is received at the host, it initializes its 
reference FIDS files vector. This vector will contain a list of files that are to be 
monitored by the FIDS for any intrusive activity. Upon initialization, the host issues a 
response “READY FOR FIDS COMMUNICATIONS” that acts as an 
acknowledgement to the server’s FIDS command. The server consequently sends the 
command “SENDING FIDS REFERENCE FILES COUNT” to prepare the host for 
retrieval of the number of files that are to be monitored in it. Subsequently, it also sends 
the host’s directory path to be scanned. Once the host gathers these two preliminary 
handshaking properties, it is then ready to receive the actual FIDS vector by issuing an 
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acknowledgement “READY TO RECEIVE FIDS REFERENCE VECTOR” to the 
security management server. 
 
3.2.2 Retrieval of FIDS Information 
 
Once the host is ready to receive the FIDS reference vector from the security 
management server, the server sends the vector in a form of a long string of characters 
through the socket using the handshaking port. The host receives this character string 
and uses the StringTokenizer from the java.lang.string class to facilitate the conversion 
of the character string into a vector collection consisting of individual file status, the 
full file path for each file that is to be monitored (see Figure 3.A), the file size and the 
MD5 code. The four properties for each file entry into the FIDS reference vector is 
separated by “#”s to ease the extraction of these properties later in the program for file 
intrusion detection. The <file status> contains either “CC” (critical) or “NC” (non-
critical). The <client file path> contains the full file path of the file that is monitored. 
The <file size> contains the actual file size of the file, and the <file MD5 code> 
contains the 16-numbered code of the file separated by commas. Figure 3.A shows the 
sample collection of FIDS reference vector. 
 
<file status>#<client file path>#<file size>#<file MD5 code> 












FIGURE 3.B: A sample reference collection of the FIDS reference vector. 
 
 
3.2.3 Processing of FIDS Current Intrusion Vector 
 
After the host obtains the FIDS reference vector collection, it begins to extract 
out the full path of each file in the vector and obtains the current MD5 code of each of 
this file residing in the host, together with the file size. These are then stored into the 
FIDS current vector. If there are changes made any monitored file(s) in the host, the 
MD5 code generated will be markedly different from the original MD5 code in the 
FIDS reference vector. The format of the FIDS current vector is also similar to the 
FIDS reference vector and is shown in Figure 3.C. A sample current collection of the 
FIDS current vector is shown in Figure 3.D. 
 
<file status>#<client file path>#<file size>#<file MD5 code> 
 












FIGURE 3.D: A sample reference collection of the FIDS reference vector. 
 
Upon comparing the sample FIDS current vector in Figure 3.D with the sample 
FIDS reference vector in Figure 3.B, it is realized that the fourth element entry 
(containing the critical file C:\sampledir2\sampledir2file2.bat, has been changed since 
its MD5 code generated at the client is markedly different. This change is also inferred 
from the change in the file size. Also in this comparison, we can see that there have 
been no file additions and deletions in the host. 
 
3.2.4 FIDS Analysis Scanning Process 
 
Once the host has generated the FIDS current vector, it issues a response to the 
server “CLIENT GENERATED MD5 COLLECTION”. The server will then send a 
message command “START FIDS SCANNNING”. This informs the 
FIDSNetworkClient program to activate the analysis of the two FIDS vectors. The file 




IDENTICAL FILE PATH ENTRY, IDENTICAL MD5 CODE, CRITICAL FILE 
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IDENTICAL FILE PATH ENTRY, IDENTICAL MD5 CODE, NON-CRITICAL FILE 
IDENTICAL FILE PATH ENTRY, DIFFERENT MD5 CODE, CRITICAL FILE 
IDENTICAL FILE PATH ENTRY, DIFFERENT MD5 CODE, NON-CRITICAL FILE 
MISSING FILE PATH ENTRY, CRITICAL FILE 
MISSING FILE PATH ENTRY, NON-CRITICAL FILE 
ADDITIONAL FILE PATH ENTRY, CRITICAL OR NON-CRITICAL FILE 
 
TABLE 3.B: FIDS Analysis Categories. 
 
The two vectors are analyzed by using the java.lang.string string methods 
extensively to compare the various properties in the vectors. FIDSNetworkClient first 
compares those file entries between the two vectors that have identical file paths. This 
means that these files are still present in the client but could be divided into four types 
as illustrated in Table 3.B. The files could have the same MD5 code, which means no 
content changes have been made to them, but could be of either critical or non-critical 
status. For these first two categories, the FIDS reference vector entries (pertaining to 
these two categories) are replaced by a new format as shown in Figure 3.E. 
 
#<client name>#<date and time of analysis>#nochange#<file path>#<file MD5 code>#<file status> 
FIGURE 3.E: FIDS reference vector typical entry in each element (new format). 
 
The new format consists of six properties separated by “#”s: <client name> 
refers to the present host that is being analyzed in the NUSNSG network. <date and 
time of analysis> refers to the current date and time of the FIDS analysis. The next 
property, nochange, indicates that no changes have been detected to the affected file 
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since the MD5 code is similar. The next two properties, <file path> and <file MD5 
code>, is similar to the definitions in the original FIDS reference vector format and is 
derived from the original file path and original MD5 code from the FIDS reference 
vector. However, the last property, <file status> is defined differently, “NonCritical” if 
the file is of non-critical status, or “Critical” if the file is of critical status. 
 
Next, if the file entries in the two vectors have similar file paths but different 
MD5 code, it means that the contents of the file have been altered. This file can be of 
critical or non-critical status (next two categories). The FIDS reference vector entry for 
these subsequent two categories will have a new format as shown in Figure 3.F. 
 
 
#<client name>#<date and time of analysis>#contentchanged#<file path>#<file MD5 code>#<file status> 
 
FIGURE 3.F: FIDS reference vector typical entry in each element (new format). 
 
Format description is similar to that of Figure 3.E except for the contentchanged 
state and the <file MD5 code> is derived from the FIDS current vector collection. 
 
File entries pertaining to the above four categories discussed so far will have their 
entries removed in the FIDS current vector collection. These respective entries will also 
be changed to a new format as discussed and shown in Figure 3.E and 3.F. Thus, any 
remaining entries in the FIDS current vector will be attributed to additional files (can be 
either critical or non-critical status, and not defined by the FIDS at the moment) 
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detected in the client. The FIDS reference vector entries that have not been altered to 
the new format will also denotes the presence of file deletions in the current client file 
monitored directory. The detection of deletions and additions will consequently have 
their entries altered to a new format and added into the updated FIDS reference vector. 
The deleted entries following a new format are described in Figure 3.G. 
 
 
#<client name>#<date and time of analysis>#deleted#<deleted file path>#<deleted file MD5 code>#<deleted file status> 
 
 
FIGURE 3.G: FIDS reference vector typical entry in each element (new format) for file 
deletions. 
 
From Figure 3.G, the third property is now listed as deleted, to indicate file 
deletion. The <deleted file path> and <deleted file MD5 code> contains the original 
path and MD5 code from the initial format of the FIDS reference vector. Similar to 
Figure 3.E and 3.F, the <deleted file status> can be either “Critical” or “NonCritical”. 
Similarly, the file additions detected by FIDSNetworkClient will have the FIDS 
reference vector format as shown in Figure 3.H. 
#<client name>#<date and time of analysis>#added#<added file path>#<added file MD5 code>#<added file status> 
 
FIGURE 3.H: FIDS reference vector typical entry in each element (new format) for file 
additions. 
 
Detected file additions will have their file paths and MD5 code placed into 
<added file path> and <added file MD5 code> respectively. However, contrary to all 
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previous analysis categories discussed, the <added file status> will only have the entry 
unknown in it since FIDSNetworkClient cannot determine if the added files into the host 
are of critical or non-critical status. The security management server will determine this.  
 
3.2.5 The FIDS Intrusion Vector 
 
As the newly formatted FIDS reference vector can also contains non-critical 
files their properties, these entries in the vector are not considered as intrusive activity 
in the FIDS security policy definitions as discussed in Chapter 2A. Hence these entries 
are redundant and can be ignored by the FIDS in the NUSNSG network. In lieu with 
this, critical file entries in the FIDS reference vector are transferred to the FIDS 
intrusion vector. The format of the intrusion vector remains the same. 
FIDSNetworkClient will then extract the host file paths corresponding to the intrusive 
files and send them over to the management server under the handshaking port so that 
the server can send the actual physical files to the affected host for critical file 
restoration. The physical files are transferred to the host through the file-transfer port 
using a secured protocol that will be described in Chapter 5 NUSNSG Secured 
Communications. After the critical files are transferred upon file intrusion detection, 
FIDSClientScanThread sends audit logging entries to the management server for 
storage into the FIDSserverlog table in the FIDSlog MySQL database (see Chapter 6 




 3.3 NNIDSClientThread 
 
The NNIDSClientThread component functions together with Agent (discussed in 
Chaper 2B) to send Windows NT security messages to the management server for 







NNTClientThread1 is used in the NUSNSG Toolkit (NNT) division of the 
NUSNSG Security Suite to scan the host’s properties in its Windows Registry for 
reporting to the management server. The component function of NNTClientThread1 is 
shown in the following Figure 3.I and described in the proceeding sections. 
 








INFORMATION: SPECIFIC OPERATING SYSTEM REGISTRY SCANS 
 
 
FIGURE 3.I: NNTClientThread1 flow chart. 
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3.4.1 NNTClientThread1 Handshaking Protocol 
 
Similar to FIDSClientScanThread, a TCP/IP socket communication mechanism 
has been adopted for NNTClientThread1 and the participating management server’s 
component on the security management server. A single port number is used for the 
NNT handshaking protocol and the transfer of registry information to the management 
server. NNTClientThread1 “listens” to this port for the registry scanning command, 
REGISTRY SCAN COMMUNICATIONS, from the management server. When this is 
received at the client, NNTClientThread1 determines the current date of activation (for 
logging purposes) and obtain the following operating system properties: 
 
• Operating System Name 
• Operating System Version 
• Operating System Architecture 
These three properties are consequently sent to the management server. Registry 
scans specific to the nature of the operating system will be conducted at the host and the 
information is reported to the management server. 
 
3.4.2 Registry scanning for Windows NT 4.0 in Intel machines 
 
There are several independent registry scans programmed for the NNT division. 
Here, we will discuss what the NNTClientThread1 will scan in the Windows NT 4.0 
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registry that is susceptible to security breaches and also to heighten the performance of 
the client machines in the NUSNSG network. 
 
NNTClientThread1 will scan the following registry parameters in the NUSNSG 









In Windows NT, NTFS volumes store a “last access” timestamp for every file 
and directory on the volume. The NTFS driver automatically updates this timestamp 
every time a file is accessed for reading or writing. That means that every time you look 
at a directory listing, NT is busily updating the file timestamps. This is often a waste of 
CPU cycles and disk bandwidth that could be better used elsewhere. 
 
NNTClientThread1 will check if the registry’s REG_DWORD value, 
NtfsDisableLastAccessUpdate, in the registry sub key path, 
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem, is activated. A value of 0 will 
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The U.S. government (National Computer Security Center) has established a 
rating system for computer operating system. This rating system rates how secure 
operating systems are. To earn a particular rating, there are certain features that an 
operating system must implement. On of these features is object reuse. Object reuse 
means that objects (include disk blocks, memory, and other shared resources) are 
cleared out after use. This prevents any leakage of confidential data. 
 
As shipped, however, NT does not implement reuse on the virtual memory’s 
pagefile. A couple of publicized attacks rely on the fact that NT’s pagefile is left intact 
when the system shuts down; it can then be scanned for useful data. 
 
NNTClientThread1 will check if the registry’s REG_DWORD value, 
ClearPageFileAtShutdown, in the registry sub key path, 
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\SessionManager\Memory 
Management\ClearPageFileAtShutdown, is activated. A value of 0 will mean that the 
function is disabled, whereas a value of 1 will indicate the converse is true. 
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Cached Logons Count 
 
By default, Windows NT workstations will cache the last ten sets of logon 
credentials received from a domain controller. This reduces the number of times a 
workstation has to contact a domain controller for verification of a logon request, and it 
often makes it possible to log on to a domain even the domain controller is not available 
on the network.  
 
NNTClientThread1 will check if the registry’s REG_DWORD value, Cached 
Logons Count, in the registry sub key path, HKLKM\Software\Microsoft\Windows 
NT\CurrentVersion\winlogon, is activated. A value of 0 will mean that the caching is 
prevented, or to the number of cached credential sets that is allowed. A value of 1 will 




When a Windows NT machine crashes, it produces a “Blue Screen of Death” 
(BSOD), which indicates the cause of the crash and gives some information about the 
system’s state when the crash happened. The problem with this approach is that the 
machine “hangs”, with BSOD displayed, until the operating system is rebooted.  
 
To check if Windows NT will automatically reboot after a crash, the sub key 
value, HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\CrashControl\AutoReboot is checked. If it is 
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set to 1, it means that the operating system will automatically reboot after a crash. It is 






While NNTClientThread1 checks the Windows NT 4.0 registry for performance 
and security parameters, NNTClientThread2 which is also running concurrently all the 
other three components in NUSNSGClient software, will set the registry’s parameters 
to values desired by the Security Manager. Similar to the FIDS division where 
monitored files collection of various hosts can be set in the management server, the 
setting of the registry is also done at the similar location. There is no need for the SM to 
set the registry physically at the various clients in the NUSNSG network. The 
communications protocol used in NNTClientThread2 is summarized in Figure 3.J and 
discussed in the proceeding sections. 








INFORMATION: IMPLEMENT DESIRED REGISTRY SETTINGS 
 
 
FIGURE 3.J: NNTClientThread2 flow chart. 
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3.5.1 NNTClientThread2 Handshaking Protocol 
 
A TCP/IP socket communication mechanism has been adopted for 
NNTClientThread2 and the participating management server’s component on the 
security management server. A single port number is used for the NNT handshaking 
protocol and the transfer of desired registry settings from the management server. 
NNTClientThread2 “listens” to the port for the registry settings command, REGISTRY 
SET COMMUNICATIONS, from the management server. Similar to 
NNTClientThread1, it determines the current date of activation and consequently 
obtains the desired registry settings from the management server upon 
acknowledgement to the server that it is ready to implement the modified registry 
settings. The server’s software (see Chapter 4 NUSNSG Server Components) is able to 
set up to nine registry settings on each of the clients in the NUSNSG network. This will 
be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4: NUSNSG Server Components 
 
The security management server in the NUSNSG network is the central 
workhorse in the network to coordinate and govern the application of security policies 
in the NUSNSG network. The server is installed with a security program consisting of 
various components that enables the three divisions, FIDS, NNIDS and NNT in the 
NUSNSG Security Suite to be activated. The overall structure containing these 
components, NUSNSGServer, is installed on the C:\NUSNSG directory of the 
management server and manages the three divisions in a convenient single user 






NUSNSGServer is a server-software in the security management server that 
coordinates the management of FIDS, NNIDS and NNT divisions within the hosts in 
the NUSNSG network. The graphical interface for NUSNSGServer, FIDSmain, is 







FIGURE 4.A: NUSNSGServer Graphical Interface, FIDSmain. 
 
4.1.1 Initialization of NUSNSGServer 
 
The execution of NUSNSGServer is preceded with some preliminary gathering 
of host-related information from the NUSNSG network. However before 
NUSNSGServer is activated, the management server should have the following 









NUSNS2  NUSNS3  NUSNS4  NUSNS5  NUSNS6  NUSNS7 … NUSNSi 
 
FIGURE 4.B: C:\NUSNSG directory structure in the security management server. 
 
 
Each NUSNSi sub-folder should contain the subsequent backup directories as it 
is in the corresponding client machines. As such, any difference in the NUSNSi 
subdirectories in the management server and the corresponding host can be detected 
accordingly by the FIDS in the NUSNSG network via FIDSNUSNSScanThread 
(discussed in the proceeding sections) in the management server and the 
FIDSClientScanThread host component. 
 
NUSNSGServer first detects the hosts residing in the NUSNSG network and 
lists the host names in a treeView Active-X control, treeViewFIDSClients (see Figure 
4.C) for the FIDS division. This action is also similarly done in the listbox Active-X 







FIGURE 4.C: treeViewFIDSClients containing the clients in the NUSNSG network. 
 
The current date of activation of NUSNSGServer is also determined for administrative 
reasons. 
 
4.1.2 NUSNSGServer Interface Layout 
 
The server’s interface for NUSNSGServer is basically divided as accordance to 
the three divisions in the NUSNSG Security Suite, namely, FIDS, NNIDS and NNT. 
The FIDS server controls are located at the left side of the interface, with NNT controls 
in the middle and NNIDS controls being at the right side. In this way, the Security 
Manager is able to manage and control the interface distinctively and easily. Figure 4.D, 




















4.2 NUSNSGServer: FIDS division 
 
In the FIDS division, NUSNSG clients to be monitored can be selected from 
treeViewFIDSClients and pressing the “Select Client(s)” button, butSelectClients. More 
than one host can be selected. Upon activation of butSelectClients button, n pop-up 
windows, FIDSNUSNSiForm, will appear according to n number of NUSNSG hosts 
that is to be monitored. The variable i, in FIDSNUSNSiForm indicate a specific pop-up 
window unique to the host in the NUSNSG network. Figure 4.G shows the pop-up 
window for host member, NUSNS2. The function of the pop-up window is discussed in 





FIGURE 4.G: FIDSNUSNS2Form pop-up window showing the backup files present in 





The FIDSNUSNSiForm window is activated upon selection of hosts to be 
monitored under the FIDS division. It will display a collection files that are resided in 
the management server of the particular NUSNSG host. The files collection is displayed 
in a treeView Active-X control (almost similar to the treeView control in the main 
FIDS division interface earlier) together with the presence of checkboxes. These 
checkboxes are used to indicate the files’ status – whether it is critical or non-critical, as 
accordance to the FIDS security policies set out in Chapter 2 Files Intrusion Detection 
System (FIDS). Hence this allows the Security Manager to select which files belonging 
to the NUSNSG host are to be of critical (checked) or non-critical (unchecked) status. 
Once this task is done, the “Generate Reference” Active-X control button, butGenRef, 
will generate the FIDS reference files collection for the specific NUSNSG host 
involved. If the host involved is NUSNS2, a NUSNS2_FIDS files collection file will be 
generated and placed in the C:\NUSNSG directory in the management server’s local 
master hard drive. This file will contain several file properties in each elemental entry 
as shown in Table 4.A and are separated by “#”s. 
 
 
<file status>#<server file path> 
 






Each entry contains the file’s status (NC for non-critical and CC for critical), a 
“#” symbol, followed by the file path in the management server according to the path 
format, C:\NUSNSG\Clients\nusnsi\<exact path>, where <exact path> is the exact file 
location in the nusnsi sub-directory. This means that if a host’s file path is 
C:\sampledir1\sampledir1file1.txt, the server’s file path for this file will be 
C:\NUSNSG\Clients\nusns2\sampledir1\sampledir1file1.txt assuming if the host name 
is NUSNS2. 
 
Next, the MD5 codes are generated for each monitored file in each host in the 
NUSNSG network. These codes are stored (for each host) in a file (also located in the 
same directory as the FIDS reference files collection) called NUSNSi_refrecurlist. 
NUSNSi_refrecurlist has a format as shown in Table 4.B. 
 
 
<file status>#<server file path>#<file size>#<MD5 code> 
 
TABLE 4.B: NUSNSi_refrecurlist file format. 
 
<file status> and <server file path> is similar to that of Table 4.A. <file size> 
contains the size information of the file in bytes, and <MD5 code> is the MD5 code is 
generated with the help from the java.security class. Once the NUSNSi_refrecurlist file 
is generated, FIDSNUSNSiForm is automatically closed and the FIDS division in 
NUSNSGServer is then ready for monitoring the client in the NUSNSG network for 
any file intrusion activity. 
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4.2.2 File Scanning/Monitoring and Scan Intervals 
 
The comboBox Active-X control, comboBoxScanIntv, allows the selection of 
scanning/monitoring time intervals of the NUSNSG clients for any file intrusive 
activity. The timing interval ranges from every 5 minutes, to as long as once every 











TABLE 4.C: comboBoxScanIntv timing intervals for scanning/monitoring of client 
files. 
 
Once the timing interval is selected, monitoring of files in the various clients 
will take place once every interval that is selected. To start monitoring upon selection of 
scan interval, the button, butScanClients, is activated. This activates monitoring of files 
in each of the clients in the network by calling the FIDSNUSNSScanThreadi files-
scanning function for each monitored host, NUSNSi. This thread will communicate 
with the FIDSClientScanThread software component over at the host’s end, 
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NUSNSGClient, as explained in Chapter 3, NUSNSG Client Components via a 




Upon the detection of file intrusion activity by the FIDS division, an account of 
the intrusive activity during the scanning time interval is handled by the FIDSLogDB 
function. This audit file-logging feature is described in greater detail in Chapter 6, 
NUSNSG Audit Logging. 
 
4.2.4 FIDSLogDaily and FIDSLogDailyForm 
 
FIDSLogDaily and FIDSLogDailyForm are two other server components in the 
NUSNSG Security Suite that access the FIDSserverlog table from the FIDSlog MySQL 
database. As this is under audit file logging, it is described in greater detail in Chapter 









4.3 NUSNSGServer: NNT division 
 
Another security feature present in the NUSNSG Security Suite server 
component collection consists of system registry scanning and remedies for possible 
attacks. This is embodied in the NNT division of NUSNSGServer. 
 
This server division consists of two parts: A sub-component for operating 
system (Windows NT) registry scanning for unsafe system settings, and another for 
changing of registry settings, which provide remedies to reduce possible attacks on the 
computer system. 
 
The NNT server division is also able to detect the operating system properties 
that the NUSNSG Security Suite is running on. 
 
The main objective of the division is to make sure that predefined system 
registry settings have legitimately secured values. It will notify the Security Manager 
once unsafe values are detected. 
 
Any host in the NUSNSG listBox, listBoxRegClients, can be selected for 
registry scanning. Once a specific client is selected, the “Activate Registry Scan” 
button, butRegScan, will start the NUSNSGRegistryScanThread thread scan function. 
This function will communicate with the NNTClientThread1 component in the host to 
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transfer the host’s operating system properties and registry-related information 
parameters to the management server for the Security Manager to monitor and evaluate.  
This was already discussed in the previous Chapter 3 NUSNSG Client 
Components, under the NNTClientThread1 section.  
 
The second sub-component will enable the Security Manager to implement and 
set appropriate host-specific registry settings to heighten client performance and 
enhance security in the NUSNSG network. 
 
Upon “checking” the checkboxes corresponding to the following registry 
parameters (see Figure 4.H), this information is transferred over to a specific host and is 
consequently implemented and set on the host’s registry by the cooperating 
NNTClientThread2 component at the host end. 
 
The “Set Registry” button, butRegSet, provides for the activation of ten remedies 
(and can be expanded further in the future) for ensuring a less possible chance of 

















FIGURE 4.H: NNT division’s registry remedies. 
 




This setting allows the Security Manager to control which drives are visible in 
the agent’s directory viewer, Windows Explorer or My Computer. It is possible to hide 
all drives or just selected ones in the agent. 
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In the management server, the Security Manager can set this key value to 
‘67108863’ to disable all drives by checking the NoDrives Active-X checkbox control. 
 
Note that these drives will still appear in File Manager, so to remove File 




This key allows the Security Manager to remove the Control Panel, Printers and 
Network Connection settings from the Start menu. 
 




By checking the NoSetFolders Active-X checkbox control, this will activate the 





When Windows exits it normally saves the desktop layout, including the icon 
location, appearance and other parameters. This key, will disable any changes from 
being saved therefore allowing the Security Manager to preserve a configured layout. 
 




Checking the NoSaveSettings Active-X checkbox control will enable this 




This registry setting can be used by the Security Manager to remove the recent 
Documents folder from the Start Menu. 
 











This registry option will allow the Security Manager to stop any user in the 
NUSNSG network from being able to shutdown the computer by disabling the shut 
down command. 
 








When Windows accesses a directory on an NTFS volume, it updates the 
LastAccess time stamp on each directory it detects. Therefore, if there are a large 
number of directories, this can severely affect network performance. 
 




Checking the NtfsDisableLastAccessUpdate Active-X checkbox control will 




Windows does not normally clear or recreate the page file. On a heavily used 
system this can be both a security threat and performance drop. Enabling this setting 
will cause Windows to clear the page file whenever the system is shutdown. 
 









By default, Windows NT stores up to five locally cached profiles. The Security 
Manager can alter this default by checking the CachedLogonsCount Active-X checkbox 
control. 
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This registry parameter controls whether Windows should automatically reboot 
after a system failure or if the blue crash screen should be displayed. By checking the 
AutoReboot Active-X checkbox control, the Security Manager is able to set the 
operating system to automatically reboot. 
 
The key is located at: 
[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\CrashControl] 
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Chapter 5: NUSNSG Secure Communications 
 
In the NUSNSG Security Suite, files are being sent from the management server 
to the host and vice versa. Little had been said about how the files transfer or even how 
communication between the management server and all the hosts is going to take place. 
All the emphasis had been placed on securing the host. In truth, securing the host alone 
is not sufficient. If a host receives an instruction from the management server to replace 
a certain file, we will not be able to verify that the order indeed originated from the 
management server and not some other computers disguising as the management server. 
The Security Suite must provide a means of verifying that the other party is indeed the 
actual, supposed entity and thus this chapter will be discussing the issues concerning 
authentication within the Security Suite. 
 
Also, in order to enhance the security of the communications further, message 
commands and files are encrypted prior to transmission. This will prevent any third 









5.1 Agent-Server Communications 
 
For the communications between hosts and the management server in the 
Security Suite, the java.net package provides was widely employed. The package is a 
set of classes that support network programming using the communication protocols 
employed by the Internet [5-1]. 
 
The Internet protocols are the world's most popular open-system protocol suite 
because they can be used to communicate across any set of interconnected networks 
and are equally well suited for LAN and WAN communications. The Internet protocols 
consist of a suite of communication protocols, of which the two best known are the 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and the Internet Protocol (IP). The Internet 
protocol suite not only includes lower-layer protocols (such as TCP and IP), but it also 
specifies common applications such as electronic mail, terminal emulation, and file 
transfer. Figure 5.A illustrates the different layers of the Internet architecture [5-2]. 
 
Application Telnet, FTP, RPC, etc 
Transport TCP, UDP 
Network IP, ICMP, IGMP 
Link Network interface and device driver 
 
 
FIGURE 5.A: Internet Architecture. 
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5.2 Network Layer 
 
The Network Layer is where the Internet Protocol (IP) resides [5-2]. IP is used 
for almost all Internet communication. When sending packets, it figures out how to get 
them to their destination. Because it does not worry about whether packets get to where 
they are going or whether they arrive in the order sent, its job is greatly simplified. If a 
packet arrives with any problems (e.g., corruption), IP silently discards it. Upper layers 
are responsible for insuring reliable reception of packets. 
 
5.2.1 IP Address Format 
 
As with any other network-layer protocol, the IP addressing scheme is integral 
to the process of routing IP datagrams through an Internet network. Each IP address has 
specific components and follows a basic format. Each host on a TCP/IP network is 
assigned a unique 32-bit logical address. The Security Suite relies on IP addressing for 
communication between management server and agents. 
 
An IP address consists of 32 bits, grouped into four octets. The minimum value 
for an octet is 0, and the maximum value for an octet is 255. Figure 5.B illustrates an 
example of an IP address. 
172 . 18 . 70 . 200 
 
FIGURE 5.B: Example of an IP address. 
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5.3 Transport Layer 
 
There are two protocols at the transport layer: the Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) and the User Datagram Protocol (UDP). TCP provides end-to-end 
reliable communication, whereas UDP does not. TCP creates a virtual circuit between 
two processes. It insures that packets are received in the order they are sent and that lost 
packets are retransmitted. In order to ensure the end-to-end control of packet 
transmission, the destination sends an acknowledgment to the source each time it 
receives a packet illustrated in Figure 5.C. TCP is used to provide communication 













Having IP addressing helps to identify a particular machine. But once at a 
machine, we need a way to identify a particular process (e.g., mail). Each process that 
wants to communicate with another process identifies itself to the TCP/IP protocol suite 
by one or more ports. A port is a 16-bit number, used by the host-to-host protocol to 
identify to which higher-level protocol or application program (process) it must deliver 
incoming messages. This 16-bit identification number is included with every UDP or 
TCP packet. When the transport layer receives a packet, it checks the port number and 
sends the data to the corresponding process. For most of the software components in the 
Security Suite, a port was used for the communication of instructions between the 
management server and host(s), while another was used (where necessary) for the 




5.5 Encryption of Transferred Information 
 
Cryptography offers security to the transfer of information across the network. 
Encryption and authentication are two important elements of cryptography in providing 
security to a network. Encryption is the process of encoding data so that it requires a 
special key to be read. This prevents unauthorized parties from viewing or modifying 
the data. In the encryption process, data to be encrypted passes through a mathematical 
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formula called an algorithm, which converts it into encrypted data called cipher text. 
These formulas require one variable, a key, which makes it difficult for anyone else to 
crack the encryption. There are two types of encryption: symmetric (secret key 
encryption) and asymmetric (public key encryption). 
 
The Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA) and Java Cryptography Extension 
(JCE) were used in the implementation of encryption and provide a set of packages of 
framework and implementations for encryption and authentication in the Security Suite. 
The JCA is part of the java2 run-time environment and composed of a number of 
classes in the java.security package. These classes provide generic APIs for functions 
like digital signatures and message digests. The JCE is an extension to the JAVA 2 
environment and simply adds simple encryption and decryption APIs to the JCA [5-3]. 
 
Pretty Good Privacy  (PGP) [5-4] based network protocol was integrated into 
the Security Suite to enhance security during information transfer. Slight modifications 









5.6 Symmetric Encryption Algorithms 
 
In symmetric encryption, the same key is used for both encryption and 
decryption of data as illustrated in Figure 5.D. There are several more popular 
symmetric encryption algorithms being used today. The security of the algorithm 
depends mainly on the key size: key sizes of the algorithms mentioned here range from 
32 bits to several hundred bits, with 64, 128 and increasingly 256 bits being frequently 
encountered. Three of the most commonly used algorithms for symmetric encryption 




            Plaintext





            Plaintext
           Message
Identical Key






FIGURE 5.D: Symmetric Encryption and Decryption Process. 
 
5.6.1 Data Encryption Standard (DES) 
 
DES stands for Data Encryption Standard, and refers to the algorithm selected in 
1976 as the official US Government algorithm for unclassified data. It was also 
 114 
probably the first serious commercial grade algorithm to be openly published. DES uses 
64-bit blocks and a 56-bit key [5-5]. It is still widely implemented. In terms of strength 
its design has stood the test of time very well, but its relatively short key length by 
modern standards means that it is now considered vulnerable to brute force attacks and 
it is also comparatively slow. 
 
Triple DES is effectively three successive DES encryptions with different keys. 





IDEA is a 64-bit block cipher with a 128-bit key [5-4], and has an excellent 
reputation for quality and strength. The main drawback of IDEA is that it is patented 




Blowfish is a 64-bit block cipher with key length variable between 32 and 448 
bits [5-6]. Blowfish is extremely fast, performing well on for example today's 32-bit 
microprocessors. It is also not patented and free for use of any kind. Despite a good deal 
of analysis, there are no known attacks on Blowfish other than brute force. 
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Since the strength of a particular algorithm depends extensively on the length of 
its key, Blowfish’s ability to support key length of up to 448 bits makes the algorithm 
hard to break. The relatively fast speed and the fact that it is being distributed freely, 
Blowfish was thus chosen as the algorithm to perform the symmetric encryption in the 
Security Suite. 
 
5.6.4 Limitations of Symmetric Encryption 
 
With symmetric encryption schemes, it is assumed that both the sender and the 
receiver have copies of the same key for encrypting and decrypting a message. Thus, 
the main obstacle of using symmetric encryption is the difficulty of ensuring the safe 




5.7 Asymmetric Encryption Algorithms 
 
Asymmetric encryption makes use of a pair of keys: a private key and a public 
key. The private key is kept secret and never divulged to anyone. The public key is 
made publicly available to those the owner chooses, typically distributed in the form of 
X.509 certificates, which will be discussed in later section. The two keys are co-
relational such that data encrypted with one key (be that the public or private key) can 
only be decrypted with the other. To send an encrypted message, the sender must look 
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up the recipient's publicly known key and use it to encrypt the message, which can then 
be read only if it is decrypted with the recipient's private key. Figure 5.E shows the 
asymmetric encryption process. No keys need change hands using this process, thus 
solving the limitation of a symmetric encryption. It is also almost impossible to derive a 
private key from the public key, thus the sender can be sure that the message will only 
be read by the intended recipient.  The most commonly used secured asymmetric 
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RSA is the most common and well-known encryption algorithm. It was invented 
by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len Adleman at MIT in 1977. Since that time, the 
algorithm has been employed in the most widely used Internet electronic 
communications encryption program, PGP. The algorithm involves multiplying two 
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large prime numbers and through additional operations deriving a set of two numbers 
that constitutes the public key and another set that is the private key. Once the keys 
have been developed, the original prime numbers are no longer important and can be 
discarded. Both the public and the private keys are needed for encryption and 
decryption. 
 
Current RSA implementation supports key sizes of 512, 1024 and 2048 bits [5-
7]. 
 
5.7.2 Limitations of Asymmetric Encryption 
 
Asymmetric encryption requires much longer keys than symmetric encryption. 
A 1024-bit asymmetric key supplies roughly the same security as a 128 bit symmetric 
key. This results in the relatively slow speed of encryption compared to symmetric key; 




5.8 Session Key Encryption in FIDS 
 
Session key encryption is a way of using both symmetric and asymmetric 
encryption together to get the best of both worlds. The confidentiality model of the 
FIDS was thus implemented using session key encryption. In the encryption process, a 
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session key (secret key) is first generated, which will only be used once for that 
particular session and will be discarded after the whole session. Blowfish is chosen to 
as the algorithm to implement the symmetric encryption with a key size of 448 bits 
being selected to ensure maximum security. This session key works with a very secure, 
fast conventional encryption algorithm to encrypt a compressed plaintext into a cipher 
text. WinZip was used for the data compression prior to the encryption. Data 
compression saves modem transmission time and disk space and, more importantly, 
strengthens cryptographic security. Most cryptanalysis techniques exploit patterns 
found in the plaintext to crack the cipher. Compression reduces these patterns in the 
plaintext, thereby greatly enhancing resistance to cryptanalysis. 
 
Once the data is encrypted, the session key is then encrypted with the recipient's 
RSA public key. A key size of 1024 bits will be sufficient to provide the security 
required as well as ensuring efficiency is not compromised. The recipient’s public key 
is obtained from the X.509 certificates (section 5.9.1) on the sender’s local machine. 
This public key-encrypted session key is then transmitted along with the cipher text to 
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FIGURE 5.F: Session Key Encryption Process. 
 
Decryption works in the reverse. The recipient uses his or her private key to 
recover the temporary session key. The recovered session key is then used to decrypt 
the conventionally encrypted cipher text. Finally, the decrypted cipher text is 
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Authentication is the process of determining that a message has not been 
surreptitiously altered, or that person is who they claim to be. The authentication model 
employed in the Security Suite is similar to that of PGP. It makes use of MD5, digital 
signature and certificates to provide assurance for the source of the message. 
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5.9.1 Digital Certificate 
 
A digital certificate attests to the validity of a public key of an individual, an 
organization, a program, a computer, etc., and can thus verify that a specific public key 
does in fact belong to a particular individual. This verification prevents impersonation 
of public keys and ensures that an entity is who it says it is. The current proposed 
Internet standard for digital certificates is the X.509 certificate format. 
 
5.9.2 Digital Signature 
 
A digital signature is an electronic signature that cannot be forged. It is a 
computed digest of the text, encrypted and sent with the text message. The recipient 
decrypts the signature and re-computes the digest from the received text. If the digests 
match, the message is authenticated and proved intact from the sender. 
 
Figure 5.H illustrates the authentication of a message using digital signature in 
the FIDS. The sender uses a one-way hash function (MD5) to compute a digest of the 
message, producing a 128 bits digest output. Next the sender’s private key (RSA private 
key) is used to encrypt the digest, turning it into a digital signature. The signature is 



























FIGURE 5.H: Generation of Digital Signature. 
 
Upon receiving the digital signature and the plaintext message, the recipient 
uses the sender’s public key published in a X.509 certificate obtained from the recipient 
local computer and decrypt the digital signature, obtaining the 128 bits hash value. The 
recipient then re-computes the MD5 digest value of the received message. If the digests 




























FIGURE 5.I: Verification of Digital Signature. 
 
Digital signatures provide a way of guaranteeing the integrity of the message 
send across the network. The signature is check against the message to determine that 
the message has not been changed since it was signed. Digital signatures also establish 
the identity of the signer. As only the possessor of a private key can sign a piece of data, 
it can be assumed that as long as the key has not been compromised, the sender did 






5.10 Encryption and Authentication 
 
The concept of both session key encryption and digital signature was combined 
for the implementation of the Security Suite security model to provide for both 
confidentiality and authentication. The combine model for the sender’s end and 
receiver’s end are shown in Figure 5.J and Figure 5.K respectively. The steps taken for 
the combined model on the sender and the receiver end are summarized. 
 
5.10.1 Combined Model on Sender End 
 
1. Message digest for plaintext message is computed using MD5 algorithm to 
produce a 128 bits digest. 
2.  The 128 bits digest is signed by the sender’s private key using RSA algorithm 
producing the digital signature. 
3. The digital signature is encrypted by the recipient’s public key obtained from 
the X.509 certificate. RSA algorithm is used in the encryption of the digital 
signature. 
4. The plaintext message is compressed using WinZip. 
5. A secret Blowfish session key is generated and used to encrypt the compressed 
message to obtain the cipher text. 
6. The secret Blowfish session key is encrypted by the recipient’s public key 
obtained from the X.509 certificate. RSA algorithm is used in the encryption of 
the secret Blowfish session key. 
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7. The encrypted digital signature, encrypted secret Blowfish session key and the 
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FIGURE 5.J: Session Key Encryption and Digital Signature for Sender End. 
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5.10.2 Combined Model on Receiver End 
 
1. The secret Blowfish session key was obtained by decrypting the encrypted 
session key received with the recipient’s private key. RSA algorithm was used 
in the decryption. 
2. The secret Blowfish key was used to decrypt the cipher text received, obtaining 
the compressed plaintext message. 
3. WinZip was used to retrieve the uncompressed plaintext message. 
4. Message digest for plaintext message is computed using MD5 algorithm to 
produce a 128 bits digest. 
5. The digital signature was obtained by decrypting the received encrypted digital 
signature. The recipient’s private key was used together with the RSA algorithm 
in the decryption. 
6. The digital signature was decrypted by the sender’s public key to retrieve the 
128 bits signed digest. 
7. The computed digest was compared to that obtained from the digital signature. 
The plaintext message was accepted if the digest matches, else the plaintext 
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Chapter 6: NUSNSG Audit Logging 
 
Audit logging forms an integral part of organizing and storing archival security-
related information derived from the execution of various components in the NUSNSG 
Security Suite. This information is stored in a unified database structure that the 
Security Suite can easily get access into/from. Analysis of the audit information have 
been made possible in the Security Suite and helps to provide key indications of 




6.1 Audit Logging in FIDS 
 
As mentioned in section 3.2.5 of Chapter 3, the FIDS Intrusion Vector 
containing only critical files (and their respective properties, which is also likened to the 
FIDS reference vector’s format in Figure 3.C), is used as a means to register critical file 
audit logging activities in the management server. 
 
Upon the detection of intrusion activity by the FIDS division, the critical files 
are automatically restored in the affected host. It was noted in section 3.2.5 that the 
intrusion vector is then sent to the management server for FIDS audit logging. 
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This occurs in the form of a long string of characters through the FIDS TCP/IP 
communications socket. Each entry of the vector is terminated with an end-of-line 
character to indicate the end of that respective FIDS audit logging entry. With this, the 
server is thus able to know how many audit entries to enter into the FIDS audit logging 
database, FIDSlog, and to facilitate the ease of extraction of file properties into the 
database. 
 
6.1.1 NUSNSG Security Suite database 
 
The NUSNSG Security Suite has a dedicated audit-logging database to store 
archival logging information coming from the three divisions: FIDS, NNIDS and NNT. 
The database was created using MySQL [6-1], which is the choice of database for the 
NUSNSG Security Suite. The MySQL database is able to deliver a very fast, multi-
threaded, multi-user, and robust SQL (Structured Query Language) database server. 
 
Setting up the MySQL environment in the NUSNSG Windows NT network 
 
Firstly, the database server package was installed in the default C:\MySQL local 
directory in the management server. The MySQL server was set up with the following 
administrative parameters: username = root, and password = pgppgp. Activation of the 
MySQL server is set to the manual mode, so that the database server will have to be 
activated each time the NUSNSG Security Suite is started in the NUSNSG network. 
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However, MySQL can also be configured to automatically start up the database 
server upon boot up of the management server [6-1]. 
 
In order to start the server manually, the command, ‘NET START MYSQL’, 
was activated from a DOS console window. To stop the server manually, one can input 
the command, ‘NET STOP MYSQL’. Once the server is activated, the FIDSlog 
database is accessed via the command (in the C:\MySQL\bin directory) in the console 
window: 
 
mysql -u root -ppgppgp FIDSlog 
 
Prior to the activation of the NUSNSG Security Suite, the FIDS division audit 
logging table, FIDSserverlog, was created by inputting the following SQL command in 
the mysql prompt:  
 
mysql> CREATE TABLE FIDSserverlog (host VARCHAR(20), date CHAR(6), time 
CHAR(6), path VARCHAR(50), action VARCHAR(15), status CHAR(2)); 
 
From the command above, we can see that FIDSserverlog table consists of the 





 Column Header Character Size Definition 
Host 20 Host client name 
Date 6 In DDMMYY1 format for which the file activity took place. 
Time 6 In HHMMSS2 format for which the file activity took place. 
Path 50 Full client path of the file 
Action 15 ‘contentchanged’ for a content altered file 
‘added’ for a additional file 
‘deleted’ for a deleted file 
Status 2 ‘CC’ if critical file, ‘NC’ if non-critical file 
 




The sub-component, FIDSLogDB, is called from the management NUSNSG 
Security Suite server software, NUSNSGServer, whenever a FIDS audit entry is to be 
stored into FIDSlog. Once NUSNSGServer receives the audit information, it is 
reconstructed into a JAVA Vector object and is processed by the FIDSlogDB server 
component to extract the file logging information (as illustrated in Table 6.A earlier). 
 
                                                 
1 DDMMYY: Day, Month, Year. For example 4th August 2002 will be in FIDSserverlog as 040802. 
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2 HHMMSS: Hour, Minute, Second. For example, 3:45:30PM will be in FIDSserverlog as 154530. 
After the FIDSLogDB is activated for audit logging, a database connection is 
made using the DriverManager (from java.sql class) and log entries are entered into 
FIDSserverlog by the following steps: 
 
1) Load the JDBC driver 
 










2) Connect to the data source 
 
The driver supplies methods to make a Connection, but requires a specific type 




Using the DriverManager class, you request a Connection using the passed URL 
and the DriverManager selects the appropriate driver; here, only the MySQL 
driver is loaded. Here's the standard form of the Connection request: 
 




In the case of FIDSlogDB, it will be: 
 




3) Inserting FIDS logging entries into FIDSserverlog 
 
While the Connection class has a number of capabilities, in order to use DDL or 
Data Manipulation Language (DML) SQL statements, a Statement object is 
required. So the preliminary step before inserting logging information into 
FIDSserverlog, is to ask the Connection for a Statement object: 
 
Statement st = dbconn.createStatement(); 
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In FIDSserverlog, for example, if a content changed file is to be logged, the 
statement will be: 
 
INSERT INTO FIDSserverlog (host, date, time, path, action, 
status) VALUES (‘nusns2’, ‘040802’, ‘154530’, 
‘C:\NUSNSG\Clients\nusns2\test1.txt’, ‘contentchanged’, ‘CC’); 
 
Note: In the FIDSlogDB component, the six column headers (host, date, time, path, 
action, and status) information are extracted from the FIDS intrusion vector using the 
StringTokenizer Object from java.lang class, before it is entered into FIDSserverlog. 
The date and time format from the vector is also different from the format used in 
FIDSserverlog, so a date and time processing method was used to convert the vector 




From NUSNSGServer, the FIDSLogDaily component can be accessed from the 
management server to provide means of feedback to the security manager of any file 
intrusions that have taken placed since the last FIDS scanning activation. 
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FIDSLogDaily produces a report-styled analysis that provides any file intrusion activity 
in the NUSNSG network. This is done by ‘querying’ the FIDSserverlog table in 
FIDSlog MySQL database for possible intrusions from a predefined date period (for 
example, from the last FIDSLogDaily activation). If there is a presence of intrusive 
activity, the results of the SQL query will be stored in the FIDSLogDaily activation 
vector. The contents in the vector can be displayed in the FIDSmain server software and 
at the same time, a FIDS log report file (specific to the day of activation) will be 
generated and stored in the C:\NUSNSG directory. 
After the FIDSLogDaily is activated for log reporting, a database connection is 
made using the DriverManager (from java.sql class) and an SQL query into 
FIDSserverlog is executed, followed by storage into the FIDSLogDaily activation 
vector in the next few steps: 
 
1) Load the JDBC driver 
 









2) Connect to the data source 
 
The driver supplies methods to make a Connection, but requires a specific type 
of URL, which uses the jdbc protocol. The generalized form is 
jdbc:<subprotocol>:<subname>.  
 
Using the DriverManager class, you request a Connection using the passed URL 
and the DriverManager selects the appropriate driver; here, only the MySQL 
driver is loaded. Here's the standard form of the Connection request: 
 




In the case of FIDSLogDaily, it will be: 
 




3) SQL query into FIDSserverlog 
 
An SQL query into FIDSserverlog is done by gathering the logging entries 
pertaining to critical file activity, as observed in the SQL statement below: 
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 activationquery = “SELECT * FROM FIDSserverlog WHERE status = 
‘cc’”; 
 
The results of the query will be in stored in ResultSet, activationrs, before 
inputting into the activation vector in proper format. 
 
ResultSet activationrs = st.executeQuery(activationquery); 
 
4) Processing ResultSet into activation vector 
 
The results of the query (in ResultSet, activationrs) are organized in terms of the 
period of the file activity since the last FIDSLogDaily activation. Any critical 
file activity that occurred earlier than the last activation date is ignored since 
these activities had been registered and reported into the FIDS log report files 
that can be found in the C:\NUSNSG directory. 
 
Once the relevant intrusive file activity is placed into the FIDSLogDaily 
activation vector, it is presented in the FIDSLogDailyForm component that is a 





6.2 Audit Logging in NNIDS 
 
Security audit logging for the NNIDS component is similar to the FIDS 
component in the NUSNSG Security Suite. The only difference would be in the log 
archival of security information parameters as discussed in the following section.  
 
6.2.1 NNIDSserverlog table 
 
The NNIDSserverlog table in the FIDSlog database is used to archive the 
Windows NT event logs originating from the various hosts in the NUSNSG network. 
The NNIDSserverlog table consists of column headers, their respective character sizes 
and definitions as shown in Table 6.B. 
Column Header Definition 
EID Security event Identification 
EType Security event type 
ECategory Security event category 
EDate Date at which the security event took place 
ETime Time at which the security event took place 
UserID User Identification for the client computer 
ComputerName Host name of computer in NUSNSG network 
 
TABLE 6.B: NNIDSserverlog table. 
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Chapter 7: NUSNSG JAVA Techniques 
 
Certain Java coding practices and methods have been applied to realize the 
NUSNSG Security Suite during its developmental stages. The server components 
discussed in Chapter 4, NUSNSG Server Components, have been coded with 
multithreading in mind since the server is servicing more than one host in the NUSNSG 
network. TCP/IP socket programming is also employed to enable the execution of the 
FIDS handshaking protocol and critical files transfer. Vectors have been used 
extensively throughout the various host and server components to facilitate the storage 






A thread, sometimes called an execution context or a lightweight process, is a 
single sequential flow of control within a program. Multiple threads are often used in a 
single program, running at the same time and performing different tasks as illustrated 
by Figure 7.A. Each thread is a sequential flow of control within the same program and 
runs independently from the others, but at the same time. Threads are employed to 






FIGURE 7.A: Two Sequential Threads in a Single Program. 
 
Threads are used to facilitate multitasking in the NUSNSG Security Suite 
(FIDS).  A single thread will be started for the monitoring of each agent. This allows 




7.2 TCP/IP Socket Communications 
In the NUSNSG host-server software, we have seen that the management server 
provides some service, such as processing database queries, host-server handshaking 
communication or sending out critical files to the various hosts. The host uses the 
service provided by the management server and the communication that occurs between 
each host and the management server must be reliable. That is, no data can be dropped 
and it must arrive on the host side in the same order in which the management server 
sent it, regardless whether it is a file or information transfer. 
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Transfer Control Protocol or better known as TCP provides a reliable, point-to-
point communication channel that the NUSNSG host-server components use to 
communicate with each other. To communicate over TCP, the host and server 
components establish a connection to one another. Each program binds a socket to its 
end of the connection. To communicate, the host and the management server each reads 
from and writes to the socket bound to the connection. 
 
7.2.1 Sockets 
A socket is one endpoint of a two-way communication link between two 
programs running on the network. A socket is bound to a port number so that the TCP 
layer can identify the application that data is destined to be sent. 
 
Normally, a server runs on a specific computer and has a socket that is bound to 
a specific port number. The server just waits, listening to the socket for a host to make a 
connection request. On the host-end: The host knows the hostname of the machine on 
which the server is running and the port number to which the server is connected. To 
make a connection request, the host tries to rendezvous with the server on the server's 
machine and port. If everything goes well, the server accepts the connection. Upon 
acceptance, the server gets a new socket bound to a different port. It needs a new socket 
(and consequently a different port number) so that it can continue to listen to the 
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original socket for connection requests while tending to the needs of the connected host. 
On the host side, if the connection is accepted, a socket is successfully created and the 
host can use the socket to communicate with the server. Note that the socket on the 
client side is not bound to the port number used to rendezvous with the server. Rather, 
the host is assigned a port number local to the machine on which the host is running. 
The host and server can now communicate by writing to or reading from their sockets. 
 
7.2.2 java.net Package 
The java.net package in the Java platform provides a class, Socket, that 
implements one side of a two-way connection between your Java program and another 
program on the network. The Socket class sits on top of a platform-dependent 
implementation, hiding the details of any particular system from your Java program. By 
using the java.net.Socket class instead of relying on native code, your Java programs 
can communicate over the network in a platform-independent fashion.  
Additionally, java.net includes the ServerSocket class, which implements a socket 
that servers can use to listen for and accept connections to clients. This lesson shows 





A Java Vector, like an array, contains items that can be accessed using an 
integer index. However, the size of a Vector can grow and shrink as needed to 
accommodate adding and removing items after the Vector has been created. The Vector 
class has been used as a collective entity in various client and server components in the 
NUSNSG Security Suite effectively. 
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Chapter 8: NUSNSG Security Suite Development 
 






Additional codes not related to the actual function of the application have been 
added to ensure that the programs meet the above requirement of a well engineered 
software. Codes were also added to facilitate testing and checking of program execution 
sequence. 
 
Comments have been included to make the program readable.  Every module 
and sub-routines have comments to explain their functions.  This ensures 





8.1 FIDS Component  
 
 The coding of the FIDS was done in a modular process through the object-
oriented approach of the Java 2 language. This simplifies the debugging and testing of 
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the FIDS program. Preliminary tests were conducted to determine the choice of 
algorithm for the implementation of the hashing function used in the FIDS component. 
The two candidates were SHA-1 and MD5. It was discovered that MD5 has a relatively 
faster speed and since speed is of paramount importance [2B-4], MD5 was chosen 
ahead of SHA-1. 
 
  The second stage of the code development is the implementation of the file 
detection algorithm. This was carried out on a single computer. After the coding for the 
detection of file intrusion, testing was carried out by intentionally altering, deleting and 
adding files to the system. After numerous debugging stages, the detection algorithm 
was deemed to be working properly with a high level of efficiency. 
 
  Next, the file transfer through Java socket was coded and tested. Coding and 
testing was done on a single computer. A server program (in the form of a server 
listener) was run and a request routine (sending a single line of message by the client 
program) was simultaneously activated (from the same computer) to test the response of 
the server program. The server program managed to receive the message and an 
acknowledgement sent out from the server program was also successfully received in 
the client program. The testing on a single computer first made the development faster 
and without the hassle of having to move around two computers to check the results. 
Once the communication on a single system succeeds, further communication tests 
were carried on two systems over the local area network. It was noticed that there is a 
slight time difference for transmission on a single system and between two systems. 
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The transmission on two systems heavily depends on the traffic conditions of the 
network, which is rather heavy in the afternoon and slowing down the transfer 
significantly. 
 
  The implementation was done in stages with the coding of the symmetric 
encryption, followed by the asymmetric encryption procedure and finally the concept of 
digital signature and digital certificate was studied and coded. The RSA keys were first 
generated for each of the systems on the network. The corresponding digital certificates 
was exported and installed in all the systems. Testing was carried out to ensure the 
encryption process did not alter the content of files transferred between two systems. 
Different signatures were used and it was verified that the digital signature indeed 
managed to authenticate the sender. The last module to be developed is the graphical 
user interface. 
 
  Finally, all the modules were integrated to form the FIDS. The integrated FIDS 
were tested successfully for its ability to detect file intrusions on hosts and the 




8.2 NNIDS Component 
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Development of the host and server daemon programs were done based on 
Visual C++ Version 6.  Two computers were setup in the laboratory. The management 
server and host are setup on one system while the other is used as a client computer for 
testing. Windows NT 4.0 was installed on both systems under one domain. The coding 
decision was to create modular functional routines and conduct tests as each one was 
developed. The host and server daemon programs were treated as separate programs 
completely as they run on different machines. 
 
MSDN Library provided a great source of reference with more than a gigabyte 
of technical programming information, documentation, technical articles, etc.  A good 
C Programming book [8-1] was also frequently referenced to during the coding of the 
programs. 
 
The decision was to create modular functional routines and conduct tests as each 
one was developed.  The Agent and Manager programs were treated as separate 
programs completely as they run on different machines.  Program listings are shown in 
Appendix D and Appendix E respectively. 
 
  The host daemon is tested by creating mock intrusion events like clearing of log 
file and noticing the beep sound together with a generation or update of the Event file 




  It is not necessary to conduct tests on the server daemon program with the host 
daemon running. By simply changing the Event ID and details of Event file, many 





8.3 NNT Component  
  
 The NUSNSG Toolkit (NNT) component is written in modular form so that each 
internal module could be tested before the next module is created. Debugging was done 
throughout the project phases and upon modules completion, they were integrated 




8.4 Integration  
 
   The three components in the NUSNSG Security Suite (FIDS, NNIDS and NNT) 
and the binding security elements were integrated together via the Visual Basic Version 
6.0-based graphical interface and tested for functionality and efficiency similar to the 
above integration methods for the various components. 
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8.5 Tests and Evaluation 
 
As mentioned earlier, testing of the program was carried out as soon as each 
module was completed.  Integration tests between related modules are then carried at 
the earliest opportunity.  With information transfer between modules done via text file, 
integration is simple.  All that is needed is to pre-define the template of the text file and 
its directory location in the computer system. 
 
The Agent program is tested by creating mock intrusion events like clearing of 
log file and noticing the beep sound together with a generation or update of the 
Event.txt file capturing the relevant data.  Tests included verifying all defined events to 
be detected for completeness. 
 
It is not necessary to conduct tests on the Manager program with the Agent 
running.  By simply changing the Event ID and details of Event.txt file, many different 









8.6 CPU Utilization 
 
CPU utilization test was carried out for the Agent program to ensure minimum 
resource consumption.  This is to ensure that the host remains efficient to perform its 
intended functions and provide all designed services efficiently.  Result obtained in 
Figure 8A and Figure 8B below showed that the Agent utilized 2% of the CPU resource 








 FIGURE 8B: CPU Utilization with NUSNSG Agent component running 
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Chapter 9: NUSNSG Conclusion 
 
 
As the use of intranet networks becomes more common in business 
environments and organizations, protecting such networks from intrusion elements is of 
critical importance.  A system such as the network security suite studied has been 
devised to achieve a high level of safety and security in preserving the integrity of 
information residing in an intranet network.   
 
The various components of the suite deals with different aspects of ensuring the 
security objectives – The FIDS has been designed to target malicious users from within 
the local area network and handle unauthorized file activities in real-time and constantly 
updates the central management server (and hence the Security Manager) the state the 
network is in.  Audit logging collection and analysis has been introduced to capture all 
file activities in the network and provide a means of historical and statistical analysis 
when detecting trends of attacks and malicious behavior.  The network security toolkit, 
NNT, is used to provide a systematic way in configuring and manipulating the 
properties of the network elements to suit an organization’s security objectives.  Finally, 
together with the NNIDS component that seeks to analyze security events in the 
Windows environment and decides on appropriate actions, enhances the effectiveness 
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None Any system that fails to meet the requirements in Division A, B, or 
C. 
 
C1 Discretionary Security Protection: System incorporates some for of 
controls capable of limiting access on an individual basis.  The user 
decides what protections to enforce, such as UNIX file permissions. 
 
C2 Controlled Access Protection: Systems in this class enforce more 
access control than C1 systems, making users individually 
accountable for their actions through logon procedures, auditing of 
events, and resource isolation. 
 
B1 Labeled Security Protection: All the features required for class C2 
plus an informal statement of the security policy model, data 
labeling, and mandatory access control over named subjects and 
objects must be present.  The system enforces some form of 
protection that is not under your control. 
 
B2 Structured Protection: All controls in B1 extended to all subjects and 
objects in the system.  In addition, convert channels are addressed. 
 
B3 Security Domains: Must satisfy the reference monitor requirements 
that it mediates all accesses of subjects to objects, be tamperproof, 
and be small enough to be subjected to test and analysis. 
 
A1 Verified Design: Functionally equivalent to B2 except the user must 




Verified Implementation: Extensive verification methodology, 
















Performs user management, reconfigures the server, and 
manages access controls. 
 
Write Allow the user to modify the contents  of the file. 
 
Delete Allows the user to delete the file.  On an NTFS file 
system, the file cannot be recovered using a disk utility. 
 
Change Permission Allows the user possessing this access right to change the 
permissions on the file. 
 
Execute Executes the file as long as it is a program. 
 
Take Ownership Changes the ownership of the file to another user. 
 













User is not permitted to access the directory in any way. 
 
List Files or subdirectories contained in this directory can be 
listed. 
 
Add User can create files or new subdirectories. 
 
Read User can display information about the file or directory. 
 
Add & Read User can create new directories, display who owns the 
directory and its associated access rights. 
 

















Event ID:  512 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  Windows NT is starting up. 
 
Event ID:  513 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  Windows NT is shutting down. All logon sessions will be 
  terminated by this shutdown. 
 
Event ID:  514 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  An authentication package has been loaded by the Local 
               Security Authority. This authentication package will be 
               used to authenticate logon attempts. 
               Authentication Package Name: %1 
 
Event ID:  515 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  A trusted logon process has registered with the Local 
               Security Authority. This logon process will be trusted to 
               submit logon requests. 
               Logon Process Name: %1 
 
Event ID:  516 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  Internal resources allocated for the queuing of audit 
               messages have been exhausted, leading to the loss of some 
               audits. 





Event ID:  517 
Type:   Success Audit 




               Primary User Name: %1       Primary Domain: %2 
               Primary Logon ID: %3        Client User Name: %4 
               Client Domain: %5          Client Logon ID: %6 
 
Event ID:  518 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  A notification package has been loaded by the Security 
               Account Manager. This package will be notified of any 
               account or password changes. 






Event ID:  528 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  Successful Logon: 
               User Name: %1              Domain: %2 
              Logon ID: %3               Logon Type: %4 
               Logon Process: %5          Authentication Package: %6 
               Workstation Name: %7 
 
Event ID:  529 
Type:   Failure Audit 
Description:  Logon Failure: 
               Reason: Unknown user name or bad password 
               User Name: %1               Domain: %2 
               Logon Type: %3              Logon Process: %4 
               Authentication Package: %5  Workstation Name: %6 
 
Event ID:  530 
Type:   Failure Audit 
Description:  Logon Failure: 
              Reason: Account logon time restriction violation 
              User Name: %1               Domain: %2 
              Logon Type: %3              Logon Process: %4 




Event ID:  531 
Type:   Failure Audit 
Description:  Logon Failure: 
              Reason: Account currently disabled 
              User Name: %1               Domain: %2 




              Authentication Package: %5  Workstation Name: %6 
 
Event ID:  532 
Type:   Failure Audit 
Description:  Logon Failure: 
              Reason: The specified user account has expired 
              User Name: %1               Domain: %2 
              Logon Type: %3              Logon Process: %4 
              Authentication Package: %5  Workstation Name: %6 
 
Event ID:  533 
Type:   Failure Audit 
Description:  Logon Failure: 
              Reason: User not allowed to logon at this computer 
              User Name: %1              Domain: %2 
              Logon Type: %3              Logon Process: %4 
              Authentication Package: %5  Workstation Name: %6 
 
Event ID:  534 
Type:   Failure Audit 
Description:  Logon Failure: 
              Reason: The user has not been granted the requested logon 
              type at this machine 
              User Name: %1               Domain: %2 
              Logon Type: %3              Logon Process: %4 
              Authentication Package: %5  Workstation Name: %6 
 
Event ID:  535 
Type:   Failure Audit 
Description:  Logon Failure: 
              Reason: The specified account's password has expired 
              User Name: %1               Domain: %2 
              Logon Type: %3              Logon Process: %4 





Event ID:  536 
Type:   Failure Audit 
Description:  Logon Failure: 
              Reason: The NetLogon component is not active 
              User Name: %1               Domain: %2 
              Logon Type: %3              Logon Process: %4 
              Authentication Package: %5  Workstation Name: %6 
 
Event ID:  537 




Description:  Logon Failure: 
              Reason: An unexpected error occurred during logon 
              User Name: %1               Domain: %2 
              Logon Type: %3              Logon Process: %4 
              Authentication Package: %5  Workstation Name: %6 
 
Event ID:  538 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  User Logoff: 
               User Name: %1              Domain: %2 
               Logon ID: %3               Logon Type: %4 
 
Event ID:  539 
Type:   Failure Audit 
Description:  Logon Failure: 
              Reason: Account locked out 
              User Name: %1               Domain: %2 
              Logon Type: %3             Logon Process: %4 










Event ID:  560 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  Object Open: 
              Object Server: %1           Object Type: %2 
              Object Name: %3             New Handle ID: %4 
              Operation ID: {%5,%6} 
              Process ID: %7              Primary User Name: %8 
              Primary Domain: %9          Primary Logon ID: %10 
              Client User Name: %11       Client Domain: %12 
              Client Logon ID: %13        Accesses %14 
              Privileges %15 
 
Event ID:  561 
Type:  Success Audit 
Description:  Handle Allocated: 
               Handle ID: %1               Operation ID: {%2,%3} 
               Process ID: %4 
 
Event ID:  562 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  Handle Closed: 
               Object Server: %1           Handle ID: %2 
               Process ID: %3 
 
Event ID:  563 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  Object Open for Delete: 
              Object Server: %1           Object   Type: %2 
              Object Name: %3             New Handle ID: %4 
              Operation ID: {%5,%6} 
              Process ID: %7              Primary User Name: %8 
              Primary Domain: %9          Primary Logon ID: %10 
              Client User Name: %11       Client Domain: %12 
              Client Logon ID: %13        Accesses %14 
              Privileges %15 
 
Event ID:  564 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  Object Deleted: 
               Object Server: %1           Handle ID: %2 








Event ID:  576 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  Special privileges assigned to new logon: 
               User Name: %1              Domain: %2 
               Logon ID: %3               Assigned: %4 
 
Event ID:  577 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  Privileged Service Called: 
              Server: %1              Service: %2 
              Primary User Name: %3       Primary Domain: %4 
              Primary Logon ID: %5        Client User Name: %6 
              Client Domain: %7           Client Logon ID: %8 
              Privileges: %9 
 
Event ID:  578 
Type:   Failure Audit 
Description:  Privileged object operation: 
              Object Server: %1           Object Handle: %2 
              Process ID: %3              Primary User Name: %4 
              Primary Domain: %5          Primary Logon ID: %6 
              Client User Name: %7        Client Domain: %8 






Event ID:  592 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  A new process has been created: 
               New Process ID: %1          Image File Name: %2 
               Creator Process ID: %3      User Name: %4 
               Domain: %5                  Logon ID: %6 
 
Event ID:  593 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  A process has exited: 
               Process ID: %1              User Name: %2 
               Domain: %3               Logon ID: %4 
 
Event ID:  594 
Type: Success  Audit 
Description:  A handle to an object has been duplicated: 
               Source Handle ID: %1        Source Process ID: %2 
               Target Handle ID: %3        Target Process ID: %4 
 




Type: Success  Audit 
Description:  Indirect access to an object has been obtained: 
              Object   Type: %1           Object Name: %2 
              Process ID: %3              Primary User Name: %4 
              Primary Domain: %5          Primary Logon ID: %6 
              Client User Name: %7        Client Domain: %8 






Event ID:  608 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  User Right Assigned: 
              User Right: %1              Assigned To: %2 
              Assigned By: 
              User Name: %3              Domain: %4 
              Logon ID: %5 
 
Event ID:  609 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:   User Right Removed: 
              User Right: %1              Removed From: %2 
              Removed By: 
              User Name: %3               Domain: %4 
              Logon ID: %5 
 
Event ID:  610 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  New Trusted Domain: 
              Domain Name: %1             Domain ID: %2 
              Established By: 
              User Name: %3               Domain: %4 
              Logon ID: %5 
 
Event ID:  611 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  Removing Trusted Domain: 
               Domain Name: %1             Domain ID: %2 
               Removed By: 
               User Name: %3               Domain: %4 
              Logon ID: %5 
 
Event ID:  612 
Type:   Success Audit 




              New Policy: 
              Success   Failure 
                %1          %2     System 
                %3          %4     Logon/Logoff 
                %5         %6     Object Access 
                %7          %8     Privilege Use 
                %9         %10     Detailed Tracking 
               %11         %12     Policy Change 
               %13         %14     Account Management 
              Changed By: 
              User Name:  %15  Domain Name: %16 






Event ID:  624 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  User Account Created: 
              New Account Name: %1        New Domain: %2 
              New Account ID: %3          Caller User Name: %4 
              Caller Domain: %5           Caller Logon ID: %6 
              Privileges %7 
 
Event ID:  625 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  User Account Type Change: 
              Target Account Name: %1    Target Domain: %2 
              Target Account ID: %3       New Type: %4 
              Caller User Name: %5        Caller Domain: %6 
              Caller Logon ID: %7 
Event ID:  626 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  User Account Enabled: 
               Target Account Name: %1     Target Domain: %2 
               Target Account ID: %3       Caller User Name: %4 
               Caller Domain: %5           Caller Logon ID: %6 
 
Event ID:  627 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  Change Password Attempt: 
               Target Account Name: %1     Target Domain: %2 
               Target Account ID: %3       Caller User Name: %4 
               Caller Domain: %5           Caller Logon ID: %6 
               Privileges: %7 
 




Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  User Account password set: 
               Target Account Name: %1     Target Domain: %2 
               Target Account ID: %3       Caller User Name: %4 
               Caller Domain: %5           Caller Logon ID: %6 
 
Event ID:  629 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  User Account Disabled: 
               Target Account Name: %1     Target Domain: %2 
               Target Account ID: %3       Caller User Name: %4 
               Caller Domain: %5           Caller Logon ID: %6 
 
Event ID:  630 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  User Account Deleted: 
               Target Account Name: %1     Target Domain: %2 
               Target Account ID: %3       Caller User Name: %4 
               Caller Domain: %5           Caller Logon ID: %6 
               Privileges: %7 
 
Event ID:  631 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  Global Group Created: 
               New Account Name: %1        New Domain: %2 
               New Account ID: %3          Caller User Name: %4 
               Caller Domain: %5           Caller Logon ID: %6 
               Privileges: %7 
 
 
Event ID:  632 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  Global Group Member Added: 
               Member: %1                  Target Account Name: %2 
               Target Domain: %3           Target Account ID: %4 
  Caller User Name: %5        Caller Domain: %6 
               Caller Logon ID: %7         Privileges: %8 
 
Event ID:  633 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  Global Group Member Removed: 
               Member: %1                  Target Account Name: %2 
               Target Domain: %3           Target Account ID: %4 
               Caller User Name: %5        Caller Domain: %6 
               Caller Logon ID: %7         Privileges: %8 
 
Event ID:  634 




Description:  Global Group Deleted: 
               Target Account Name: %1     Target Domain: %2 
               Target Account ID: %3       Caller User Name: %4 
               Caller Domain: %5           Caller Logon ID: %6 
               Privileges: %7 
 
Event ID:  635 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  Local Group Created: 
               New Account Name: %1        New Domain: %2 
               New Account ID: %3          Caller User Name: %4 
               Caller Domain: %5           Caller Logon ID: %6 
               Privileges: %7 
 
Event ID:  636 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  Local Group Member Added: 
               Member: %1                  Target Account Name: %2 
               Target Domain: %3           Target Account ID: %4 
               Caller User Name: %5        Caller Domain: %6 






Event ID:  637 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  Local Group Member Removed: 
               Member: %1                  Target Account Name: %2 
               Target Domain: %3           Target Account ID: %4 
               Caller User Name: %5        Caller Domain: %6 
               Caller Logon ID: %7         Privileges: %8 
 
Event ID:  638 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  Local Group Deleted: 
               Target Account Name: %1     Target Domain: %2 
               Target Account ID: %3       Caller User Name: %4 
               Caller Domain: %5           Caller Logon ID: %6 
               Privileges: %7 
 
Event ID:  639 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:   Local Group Changed: 
               Target Account Name: %1     Target Domain: %2 
               Target Account ID: %3       Caller User Name: %4 




               Privileges: %7 
 
Event ID:  640 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:   General Account Database Change: 
               Type of change: %1          Object Type: %2 
               Object Name: %3             Object ID: %4 
               Caller User Name: %5        Caller Domain: %6 
               Caller Logon ID: %7 
 
Event ID:  641 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  Global Group Changed: 
               Target Account Name: %1     Target Domain: %2 
               Target Account ID: %3       Caller User Name: %4 
               Caller Domain: %5           Caller Logon ID: %6 





Event ID:  642 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  User Account Changed: 
               Target Account Name: %1     Target Domain: %2 
               Target Account ID: %3       Caller User Name: %4 
               Caller Domain: %5           Caller Logon ID: %6 
               Privileges: %7 
 
Event ID:  643 
Type:   Success Audit 
Description:  Domain Policy Changed: 
               Domain: %1                  Domain ID: %2 
               Caller User Name: %3        Caller Domain: %4 
               Caller Logon ID: %5         Privileges: %6 
 
Event ID:  644 
Event Type:  Success Audit 
Description:  User Account Locked Out 
  Target Account Name:  %1    Target Account ID: %2 
  Caller Machine Name:  %3     Caller User Name:  %4 
  Caller Domain:      %5         Caller Logon ID:  %6  
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